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Abstract 
This dissertation investigates how far the content of provided information can affect people‘s 
attitudes in the space of current political thinking. Specifically, it examines how opinion 
formation within political conflicts and state of affairs can be biased through varying visual and 
narrative representations in times of threat and uncertainty. Instead of using fictional scenarios or 
post-hoc evaluations, the experimental designs were applied to current political affairs and 
conducted within time frames where opinion formation was rather unsettled than cast in concrete. 
In doing so, the possibility was created to gather new insights into the assessments of ongoing 
political state of affairs and how opinion formation can be biased through the lens of available 
information. 
For example, due to the so-called Ukrainian Crisis a heavily waged dispute emerged in 
2014 about how to deal with Russia’s infringement of international law (e.g., annexation of 
Crimea) ranging from economic sanctions to military action. Although a majority of Germans 
blamed Russia for this crisis, only a minority favored to provide military aid in this conflict. 
Empirical evidence was found that one-dimensional and threatening depictions (e.g., in news 
coverage) can alter people’s military attitudes in this reemerging international conflict (Gebauer, 
Raab, & Carbon, 2016c). Furthermore, results from two experiments demonstrate how seemingly 
subtle variations of visualizing the political realities in this conflict can shape the political 
perception and reinforce stereotypical thinking (Gebauer, Raab, & Carbon, 2016a). Additionally, 
studies have shown that minimal narrative changes in the context of possible political 
conspiracies—here, the perceived relations between the US and Russia—can affect the 
conspiratorial reasoning of conspiracy believers and sceptics (Gebauer, Raab, & Carbon, 2016b). 
Finally, empirical findings will illustrate that rethinking about political issues beyond current 
international conflicts might be less suggestible and requires more tangible approaches—like 
hands-on experience—in order to alter people’s political point of view (Gebauer, Vilimek, 
Keinath, & Carbon, 2016).  
The presented findings, therefore, highlight the susceptibility of opinion formation in (re-
)emerging political conflicts and its suggestibility through informational descriptions, but do also 
point to the contextual limitation of persuasiveness—at least in some areas of political rethinking. 
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General motivation 
 
On September 9th 2016 at around 6 a.m. (Central European Time; CET) results turned into 
certainty: Donald Trump was elected as 45th President of the United States of America. The 
world seemed to remain in a state of shock. Mr. Trump, who attracted attention with populism 
and radical points of view throughout his campaign, was assessed to be unpredictable and, 
therefore, a potential and realistic threat to the present and established world orders. Subsequently 
and as a reaction to the arising threat and uncertainty, the stock prices at Japan’s NIKKEI 
INDEX—one of the few markets being open due to the time shift—dropped down to 16,211.34 
points with a loss of nearly 7 %. Germany’s DAX INDEX followed suit, opening with a loss of 
approximately 3% at 9 a.m. CET. Then, something unexpected happened: In the 15 minute 
victory speech at around 9 a.m. CET Mr. Trump renounced to relay word phrases he used in his 
campaign. Instead, he found conciliatory words for his opponent, Hillary Clinton, emphasizing 
that it should be time to come together as one united people independently of race, religion, 
beliefs or being Republican or Democrat. Subsequently, a remarkable effect ensued shortly after 
the victory speech was finished: The share markets recovered and the DAX INDEX even closed 
with a plus of 1.6 %1. 
What does this example tell us about psychology? In my opinion: A lot. As a result of Mr. 
Trump making it to the top of world politics, people started to foresee major political conflicts 
around the world. Due to his radical promises and point of views throughout his campaign, 
people were faced with potential threats and uncertainty about what might happen next. 
Therefore, and especially in the times of high political uncertainty—like we have seen after Mr. 
Trump was elected—people rely heavily on information to classify the situation and, most 
importantly, to adjust their attitudes and next steps of action. In this case, the first reaction to the 
threat of Mr. Trump becoming president was to switch to a defense mechanism in order to safe 
capital from a major financial crash. Just because of his relatively calm victory speech, investors 
readjusted their behavior, maybe believing that he is now turning into a presidential mode that 
                                                            
1  Note that this example only concentrates on developments in this very moment. The strong market increase 
afterwards might have had different causes like announced tax cuts, promises of massive investments in the US 
infrastructure, etc. 
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will help the American and global economy. However, imagine he would have announced to 
reject all trade agreements with other countries right away; probably many financial markets 
would have crashed. But he didn’t, and in this very moment, investors took it as a good sign and 
remained calm.  
Phenomena like these represent the main motivation behind this dissertation. In an age of 
information and communication where platforms like Facebook, Twitter, and online news 
services can spread information across the world within hours or even minutes, I am deeply 
interested in how far different content of information might affect people’s political thinking in 
real-time events. Particularly, my interest was drawn to the field where provided information can 
affect opinion formation in times of new political conflicts. I was impressed by research 
describing how 9/11 reminders increased the support for the (at that time) current US President 
George W. Bush as a reaction to deal with the threat of terrorism (Landau, Solomon, Greenberg, 
Cohen, & Pyszczynski, 2004) and that even seemingly subtle crosshairs—which were used by the 
conservative Tea Party member Sarah Palin targeting legislators voting for Obama's health 
care—can in fact induce violent thinking, and probably violent behavior in the end (Schoormans, 
Carbon, & Gattol, 2011).  
This thesis aims to contribute to a better understanding about how opinion formation in 
ongoing political events and current international conflicts can be affected by the content of 
provided information nowadays. 
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1. Theoretical part 
1.1 Overview 
 
To create a deeper understanding of the contextual background regarding the empirical part, I 
will describe the phenomenon of international and political conflicts from a social psychological 
perspective in paragraph 1.2. On this basis, I will outline a socio-psychological infrastructure of 
the resurrected East vs. West conflict as a reaction to the so-called Ukrainian Crisis in paragraph 
1.3—which is substantially to a context related understanding of this thesis. Next, possible 
implications such conflicts bring along will be described in paragraph 1.4 focusing on the 
dimension of intergroup relations under threat and uncertainty. Then, I will illustrate how beliefs 
and emotions can handle the way of information processing in international conflicts in paragraph 
1.5. Vivid examples concerning the role of mass communication and opinion formation in current 
political state of affairs will display the importance of information representation in international 
conflicts in paragraph 1.6. As a last step, I will characterize how all these factors might interact 
with each other in paragraph 1.7.  
Building on this work, I will lead over to the empirical part of this thesis in chapter 2. Taking the 
case of the resurrected East vs. West conflict, the article 
Gebauer, F., Raab, M. H., & Carbon, C. C. (2016c). Imagine all the forces: The 
impact of threatening news coverage on the willingness to militarily engage in the 
resurgence of the East vs. West conflict. Journal of Media Psychology –Theories, 
Methods and Applications. doi: 10.1027/1864-1105/a000180 
 
shows that threatening parts of news coverage can increase the willingness of German 
participants to militarily engage in the conflict, although a majority of Germans remained hesitant 
to advocate military means. Furthermore, evidence was found in  
Gebauer, F., Raab, M. H., & Carbon, C. C. (2016a). Back to the USSR: How 
colors might shape the political perception of East vs. West. i-Perception. doi: 
10.1177/2041669516676823 
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that solely varying visual depictions on a map where colors referred to the old-established Cold 
War patterns (Russia=red; NATO=blue) are able to shape the political perception and reinforce 
stereotypical thinking.  
 Focusing on a slightly different approach, I was interested whether minimal alterations of 
semantic cues presented in (fabricated) news articles might affect conspiratorial reasoning in a 
political context. Applying this idea to a current political debate, I investigated whether US 
investigations against FIFA in 2015 were more or less likely to be seen as a conspiracy against 
Russia to sabotage the football World Cup in 2018. The article 
Gebauer, F., Raab, M. H., & Carbon, C. C. (2016b). Conspiracy formation is in 
the detail: On the interaction of conspiratorial predispositions and semantic cues. 
Applied Cognitive Psychology, 30(6), 917-924. doi: 10.1002/acp.327 
 
describes that judgments of conspiracy believers and sceptics about the event's ‘true nature’ were 
not a priori divided—in fact, conspiracy formation in an ongoing political event was only 
affected when direct causation (Study 1) or strong purposeful intentions (Study 2) were obvious.  
These findings might give the impression that people‘s attitudes get affected on every 
layer within the field of political thinking. I will make the case that barely presenting information 
does not automatically lead to a political rethinking outside the context of political conflicts. To 
illustrate this idea, I will shift the area of interest from international conflicts to a national 
political debate, namely: Can electromobility (e-mobility) become the transportation system of 
the future in Germany? In order to be able to measure this kind of political rethinking, we used 
the Repeated Evaluation Technique (RET) by Carbon and Leder (2005a). The article  
Harsànyi, G., Gebauer, F., & Carbon, C. C. (2013). Design Evaluation: Zeitliche 
Dynamik ästhetischer Wertschätzung. In S. Boll, S. Maaß & R. Malaka (Eds.), 
Workshopband Mensch & Computer (pp. 145-153). München: Oldenburg Verlag.  
provides an example about the RET’s functional principles and shows how this measurement can 
be applied to different psychological contexts capturing the dynamics of attitude changes over 
time.  
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To see whether provided information is also persuasive in national debates outside the context of 
political conflicts, the RET was applied to measure attitude changes in the field of e-mobility. 
Since the future prospect of e-mobility in Germany faced controversial political as well as public 
debates, I wanted to investigate how far people’s attitudes might be positively affected by the 
way new developments in the field of e-mobility were presented to potential users. Findings 
described in the article  
Gebauer, F., Vilimek, R., Keinath, A., & Carbon, C. C. (2016). Changing 
attitudes towards e-mobility by actively elaborating fast-charging technology. 
Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 106, 31-36. doi: 
10.1016/j.techfore.2016.02.006 
 
show that people’s attitudes only changed in a positive way, if they had made hands-on 
experiences with electric vehicle’s fast-charging procedure, but not if participants were only 
handed out the same information in written forms.  
Thus, opinion formation seems to be more susceptible under threat and uncertainty in 
emerging international and political conflicts than in national debates about its future concepts. In 
chapter 3, I will discuss possible reasons behind these findings and describe socio-political 
implications for people’s suggestibility through informational descriptions. 
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1.2 International conflicts and the social psychological perspective  
 
Daniel Bar-Tal’s influential work about the origin and continuation of societal conflicts starts 
with the observation that conflicts might appear whenever people interact with each other. He 
claims that  
“conflicts are defined as situations in which two or more parties perceive that 
their goals and/or interests are in direct contradiction with one another and decide 
to act on the basis of this perception. […] Conflicts are inseparable and significant 
part of human life on every level of interaction; there are interpersonal conflicts, 
intra-group, intergroup, inter-organizational, intra-societal, and interethnic as well 
as international conflicts and even inter-civilization conflicts.” (Bar-Tal, 2011, p. 
1) 
That means, on a micro level, people can and inevitably will have different opinions about certain 
issues, whereas this perception of mutual contradictions leads to negotiations about how to 
proceed. For example, people can simply start to argue where to have dinner (Chinese vs. Italian), 
how to get to the restaurant (by bus or foot) or even what to drink there (red vs. white wine). 
Conflicts are, therefore, natural part of everyday life and it remains in the hands of human beings 
how to deal with them. Continuing with the example, we could either negotiate about whether to 
have Chinese or Italian food by taking the others perspective into account and trying to find 
compromises (e.g., tonight Italian and tomorrow Chinese) or we can insist on our demand to have 
that particular kind of food tonight and ignore the other one’s desire. The main difference in this 
example is: We either have one (or even two) pleasant social evenings with possible limitations 
in our food choice or we unconditionally impose our food choice with a possible outcome of 
eating alone or even not at all if we continue arguing all night long. Of course, even this example 
might have more complex features—like history of past food choices, daily mood of the 
protagonists or personality traits—that contribute to possible outcomes of the situation. However, 
it illustrates that conflicts are created and shaped by humans with specific needs and different 
choices of action that can contribute to a more or less escalating situation. 
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 Taking it from a micro to a macro level perspective, we see similar principals at work 
when it comes to the occurrence, maintenance and escalation of conflicts on an international 
level. Instead of having direct interpersonal interaction, international conflicts rely on the fact that 
people perceive themselves as being part of a society with shared beliefs, values and norms by 
simultaneously perceiving other societies with a different collective identity (David & Bar-Tal, 
2009). As a next step, people within the society have to perceive that the goals of the other 
society are opposing to their own ones. This fact does not automatically lead to far reaching 
tension or escalation between societies. It rather needs to exceed a certain limit of threat caused 
by one society and perceived by the other one to create action of defense. In fact, Bar-Tal 
distinguishes between two poles describing the intensity of intergroup conflicts: 1) tractable 
conflicts which are viewed as solvable and last a short period of time by resolving them relatively 
quickly through negotiation 2) intractable conflicts which are about perceived important goals, 
include high animosity, where both sides are not interested in compromising and both sides 
mobilize society members to participate by focusing on own needs and goals (Bar-Tal, 2011). 
Reasons and backgrounds of international conflicts can be diverse ranging from territorial, 
ideological and resources to prestige. In fact, this thesis does not concentrate on the whys and 
wherefores in the emergence of international conflicts, but rather investigates the maintained 
belief systems about how people’s political views in international conflicts can be shaped through 
information.  
As described above, people need to be mobilized to view the other side as opposing and 
highly threatening. This implies the decisive difference between interpersonal (micro) and 
international (macro) conflicts; whereas interpersonal conflicts allow direct and active exchange 
of opinions and information, within international conflicts people become more or less passive 
consumers of information to form their opinion. These information representations, therefore, 
play a key role about how international conflicts are perceived. Based on the importance of 
information representations, Bar-Tal (2011) summarizes three core elements that further 
contribute to the perception of escalating and intractable conflicts on an international level: 1) 
collective memory, 2) ethos of conflict, and 3) collective emotional orientation. 
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1) Collective memory of conflict is defined as representative images of the past remembered, and 
not necessarily been personally experienced, by society members in the historical context of 
the conflict (Kansteiner, 2002; Paez & Liu, 2011). Reminders of the conflict’s history can 
reinforce stereotypical thinking by positively depicting the own society (Baumeister & 
Gastings, 1997), portraying the opponent’s action in delegitimizing ways (Oren & Bar-Tal, 
2007) and describing the own society as a victim of the rival society’s action (Bar-Tal, 
Chernyak-Hai, Schori, & Gundar, 2009). Therefore, collective memories of the conflict do 
often produce schematically ‘black and white’ thinking neglecting differentiated perspectives 
about how the conflict emerged. 
2) Ethos of conflict differs from collective memory of conflict in so far as it rather focuses on the 
current shared societal belief and future orientation than on the historical context. It “provides 
a clear picture of the conflict, its goals, its conditions, requirements, images of the own group 
and of the rival. It indicates the direction and goals for individual and societal behavior, gives 
meaning to the societal life, imparts legitimacy to the social system, and explains and justifies 
leaders’ decisions.” (Bar-Tal, 2011, p. 21). Therefore, the ethos of conflict describes a major 
communicative part about how to proceed within the conflict. 
3) Collective emotional orientation describes the predominant emotional response invoked by 
the narratives of collective memory and ethos of the conflict. Since the depiction of escalating 
conflicts most often includes the build-up of mutual violent threats, these scenarios are very 
likely to induce fear and uncertainty to people who might be involved in it (Buzan, 2008).  
Before I will describe the impact of fear, threats and uncertainty on people’s psychological 
processes in international conflicts, I would like to outline the interaction of collective memory, 
ethos of conflict, and collective emotional orientation using the example of the resurrected East 
vs. West conflict.  
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1.3 Reemerging Cold War patterns: The resurrected East vs. West conflict 
 
“NATO and Russia do not consider each other as adversaries. They share the goal 
of overcoming the vestiges of earlier confrontation and competition and of 
strengthening mutual trust and cooperation. The present Act reaffirms the 
determination of NATO and Russia to give concrete substance to their shared 
commitment to build a stable, peaceful and undivided Europe, whole and free, to 
the benefit of all its peoples. Making this commitment at the highest political level 
marks the beginning of a fundamentally new relationship between NATO and 
Russia. They intend to develop, on the basis of common interest, reciprocity and 
transparency a strong, stable and enduring partnership.” (NATO-Russia Founding 
Act, 1997) 
Along with the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation in 2014, the declaration signed 
by NATO and Russia in 1997 seemed to be rather abstract words than political reality. Instead of 
trust, emerging distrust was seeded and political partners turned into political opponents again. 
Public, political as well as medial debates were filled with different points of views about how to 
deal with Russia’s violation of international law ranging from diplomatic solutions, economic 
sanctions or preventive military build-ups. While the public opinion was struggling with the 
current shared societal belief and future orientation in this conflict (ethos of conflict), 
representative images referring to the past (collective memory of conflict) seemed to provide the 
basis of the conflict’s reflection, namely; the Cold War era. Although political systems and 
territorial boundaries have shifted since the fall of the Iron Curtain, actual representations 
predominately referred to a new Cold War between NATO allies and the Russian Federation (for 
example see Figure 1). In doing so, people get reminded of an era where ideological beliefs 
between the superpowers USSR and NATO were worlds apart and mutual assured destruction 
was part of everyday reality until 1991. I argue that opinion formation through the lens of images 
referring to the past of one of the most intractable conflicts in human history triggers the 
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collective memory of the conflict, which induces threat and uncertainty in collective emotional 
orientations, and vice versa affects the ethos of this conflict2.  
 
 
Due to copyright issues Figure 1 had to be removed. 
 
  
 
In other words, if people get reminded by former Cold War patterns to interpret the new 
conflict between Russia and NATO allies, they adapt mindsets and emotional schemata from past 
ages to draw conclusions about the current conflict. In doing so, it undermines analytical strategy 
of interpretation and gives rise to the risk of an emotionally driven perception of the conflict 
(Bock, Henneberg, & Plank, 2014). 
   
                                                            
2 Note that I strongly believe that these effects hold true for both sides: NATO allies viewing Russia as well as 
Russia perceiving NATO allies through the lens of the former Cold War era.  
Figure 1. Cover pages from the German newsmagazines STERN 40/2014 (left) and DER SPIEGEL 
48/2014 (right). 
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1.4 Emergence and effects of threat and uncertainty on perceived intergroup 
relations 
 
As mentioned earlier, collective identity can be a strong predictor of social behavior in times of 
political crises and social changes (Polletta & Jasper, 2001). Drawing a line between us and them 
defines who shares our beliefs, values and norms and who does not. These lines do not 
necessarily need to be physical in terms of borders, but rather depend on the perceived perception 
that someone belongs to a group with a shared social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). For 
example, Germany, Poland and Russia are independent nations. At the same time Germany and 
Poland are both members of the same union of states like the European Union or NATO, which 
Russia does not belong to. Although all three states are distinct to each other, someone from 
Germany might, therefore, perceive an increased social identity with Poland through their shared 
union of states than with Russia. So far, so good and although some states share more norms, 
beliefs and identity with each other than others, everyone could get along peacefully. Things 
seem to change dramatically when, at least, one party feels that its goals and/or interests are in 
direct contradiction with one another. If we then, additionally, observe that the other side decides 
to act on the basis and that this action might have harmful consequences for me or the group I 
belong to, we perceive a state of threat and uncertainty. As a result, people tend to favor their 
own group over the other in order to protect and be protected especially during contentious and 
dangerous times (Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999). Following the well-
established intergroup threat theory by Stephan and Stephan (2000), the different types of threats 
can mainly be subdivided in symbolic and realistic threats being potentially harmful for an 
individual or a group as a whole. In their theory they define symbolic threat as a threat to a 
group’s or individuals’ religion, values, belief system, ideology, philosophy, morality, or 
worldview. Realistic threat, by contrast, describes threats to a group’s power, resources, and 
general welfare and can imply actual physical or material harm to an individual group member 
(Stephan, Ybarra, & Morrison, 2009). 
 The past Cold War conflict between the former USSR and NATO allies illustrates these 
different types of threat in an appropriate way. For both, realistic threat was omnipresent in terms 
of a possible nuclear first strike that would have cost millions of people’s life in the event of an 
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escalation. At the same time, symbolic threat was equally present since both opponents presented 
contrary ideological worldviews with communism on the one and capitalism on the other side. 
Loosing this Cold War would have automatically meant to lose one’s way of life and ideological 
identification.  
Although both symbolic as well as realistic threats do slightly vary in their consequences 
of affecting people’s attitudes in conflicts, they share common features and principles. First, 
emotional responses are likely to be negative. People react to threats with fear, anxiety and 
uncertainty (Renfro, Duran, Stephan, & Clason, 2006), which, in turn, reduces empathy for the 
outgroup leading to derogatory attitudes towards the opponent (Stephan et al., 2009). Second, 
threats in international conflicts might lead to cognitive biases in the perception of the opponents. 
Research has shown that people reinforce their stereotypes (Quist & Resendez, 2002) and judge 
outgroup’s behavior more negatively under threat (Costarelli, 2005). As a consequence, 
whenever people perceive a threat in international conflicts that might be harmful to them or the 
group they belong to, they do not process new information about the conflict in a neutral way. 
Instead, they selectively scan the presented information particularly with regard to their actual 
worldview to be able to classify the situation and to confirm or adjust their attitudes and next 
steps of action.  
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1.5 How beliefs and emotions handle the way of information processing  
 
As noticed in the previous paragraph, people react to and process information in the context of 
threats and uncertainty in particular ways. From an evolutionary psychological perspective, it 
makes sense that people tend to perceive threats faster than peaceful signs (van der Dennen & 
Falger, 1990) because processing threats faster helps to avoid possible harm (Riek, Mania, & 
Gaertner, 2006). Being able to adapt one’s behavior in the context of negative information means 
to be able to adjust reactions to the new situation with the advantage of initiating 
countermeasures immediately (Gil-White, 2001). At the same time, people seem to be triggered 
more easily by negative and threatening information than by neutral or positive ones; in many 
cases, positive information seem to be processed more consciously and need higher cognitive 
capacities3 (Jarymowicz & Bar‐Tal, 2006). This means that threatening information and 
information processing under threat tend to be driven by automatic defense reactions with a 
smaller extant of cognitive reflection. Therefore, information processing in the context of threats 
seems in particular to be persuasive. Furthermore, people do not only interpret information in the 
current (threatening) context, but do also evaluate information by referring to past experiences 
and memories of similar situations (Cacioppo & Berntson, 1994)―a phenomenon that was 
defined in paragraph 1.1 as collective memory of conflict. Therefore, I assume that  
1)  people are more susceptible of negative information especially under threat, 
2)  people process information in accordance with their worldview as a result of preexisting 
opinions related to past events. 
As outlined above, international conflicts are not―or only in minor cases―experienced directly 
by individuals themselves. International conflicts are rather perceived by reflections, portrays and 
depictions of situations delivered through various channels of communication to inform people 
about ongoing events. In most cases these information are the only source of how people build 
their opinion and, therefore, play a decisive role in opinion formation and political developments. 
This fact points to the importance of information dissemination in political affairs. Moreover, 
                                                            
3 Note that this is not meant to be seen as general rule, but rather depicts an evolutionary psychological perspective. 
Research has also shown that people tend to turn to positive affective information in order to be released from the 
stress of high uncertainty (DeWall & Baumeister, 2007). 
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within international conflicts “the reaction of leaders and the media to the threatening cues is 
crucial. When they frame the events in support of the conflict orientation, then peace process has 
very low chances to evolve.” (Bar-Tal, 2011, p. 13) 
 
1.6 In medias res: Mass communication and opinion formation in current political 
state of affairs 
 
Mass communication is defined as “the process by which a person, group of people, or 
organization creates a message and transmits it through some type of medium to a large, 
anonymous, heterogeneous audience” (Pearce, 2009, p. 624). In concrete terms, this means 
newspapers, magazines, TV, radio, but also internet platforms like Facebook, Twitter and 
YouTube. Earlier research has acknowledged the significant impact of mass communication on 
people’s personal beliefs in political conflicts. In general, it has been shown that media has the 
ability to affect people’s mindsets about political issues (Entman, 1989) and has a dominating 
influence on public opinion (McCombs & Stroud, 2014). But can channels of mass 
communication really affect political thinking and influence the course of international conflicts 
substantially? This example might provide helpful insights. 
About one year after the Iraq war started in 2003 the New York Times published an editorial 
statement that opened with the following words: 
“Over the last year this newspaper has shone the bright light of hindsight on 
decisions that led the United States into Iraq. We have examined the failings of 
American and allied intelligence, especially on the issue of Iraq’s weapons and 
possible Iraqi connections to international terrorists. We have studied the 
allegations of official gullibility and hype. It is past time we turned the same light 
on ourselves.” (The New York Times, 2004 May 26). 
What led the New York Times—among other high ranked newspapers—to reflect about their 
news coverage that was published before the war in Iraq? The main arguments of the US 
government to invade Iraq in 2003 were based on supposed information about Saddam Hussein 
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developing weapons of mass destruction and his connection to the terror organization Al–Qaeda. 
Simultaneously, a large proportion of the US media landscape reported in favor of military action 
against Iraq and anti-war perspectives questioning the presented evidence were very low (Hayes 
& Guardino, 2010). Shortly after the invasion, none of these potential threats to the Western 
world proofed to be true and the one-dimensional news coverage was accused to have played a 
key role in setting a pro-war agenda by dismissing differentiated viewpoints to the public 
(Bennett, Lawrence, & Livingston, 2008). As a consequence, an open debate about media’s 
responsibility in public affairs emerged and newspapers, like The New York Times, found 
themselves constrained to take a stand. Admittedly, this is an extreme example about how people 
can be guided into a single direction due to the presentation of specific information; whereas the 
media was most probably not the only reason why the Bush administration was able to put their 
plans into practice so easily. Nevertheless, it vividly illustrates how crucial information 
representations can influence people’s attitudes in ongoing political state of affairs.  
However, printed newspapers and traditional broadcasts as well as printed media are only 
one side of the coin. The online shift of news coverage has changed the way people consume 
their information in the context of politics (Rackaway, 2014). In the moment of political 
happenings, breaking news are spread via online news services within minutes and can 
simultaneously be shared on social networks with other people. The minimal time frame of 
publishing breaking news increases the risk of producing simplified representation of the 
situation (Papadopoulos, Bontcheva, Jaho, Lupu, & Castillo, 2016), which, in turn, affects the 
opinion of the consumer receiving this information (Sobkowicz, Kaschesky, & Bouchard, 2012). 
Research has shown that these effects even occur when people negate their impressionability to 
political advertising (Arendt, Marquart, & Matthes, 2015), or when the presentation of cues is 
very subtle (Schoormans et al., 2011). In other words, even seemingly inconspicuous details in 
news coverage or social media networks can affect people’s mindsets under certain 
constellations. Importantly, it is not the aim of this thesis to simulate the dynamics of social 
media consumption and its effects on opinion formation, neither do I want to show the 
distinctiveness between traditional and new media coverage. These examples should only help 
the reader to be able to draw possible implications of the empirical findings I will describe in 
chapter 2. 
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1.7 Blending the (theoretical) ingredients: A summary  
 
As described in paragraph 1.2, the socio-psychological infrastructure of international conflicts is 
characterized by the collective memory of conflict, ethos of conflict, and collective emotional 
orientation. We know that these facets can interact with each other and differ in the level of 
intensity with respect to each (international) conflict. Furthermore, we know that the potential 
escalation of the conflict can be threatening and induces, therefore, fear and uncertainty, which 
vice versa affects the way people process information; people react faster with defense 
approaches under threat and are more susceptible of information that confirms their current 
worldview. In addition, news broadcasting―in its various ways―seems to be an important factor 
to set first triggers guiding the way of attitude and opinion formation. 
 By applying these thoughts to the resurrected East vs. West conflict, core publication I 
examines in how far the emotional orientation of threat can alter people’s willingness to military 
engage in this conflict. Core publication II further investigates whether visual reminders of the 
past of the resurrected East vs. West conflict are able to shape the perception of the current 
political relation between both opponents. Core publication III tests if minimal narrative changes 
concerning the ethos of the conflict can affect conspiratorial reasoning in the current political 
context. Using the Repeated Evaluation Technique’s (RET; Carbon & Leder, 2005a) functional 
principles (described in peripheral publication I), core publication IV describes that attitudes 
beyond current international conflicts might be less suggestible and require more tangible 
approaches in order to alter people’s political point of view.  
 To test the effects of news broadcasting in such scenarios in a most ecological valid way, 
I included potential triggers in (mostly) fabricated news articles and used very short time frames 
for conducting these studies. In doing so, I tried to create the possibility to gather new insights 
into the way of construing political thinking under real-time circumstances. The following section 
2 of this thesis will describe the motivation, empirical findings and a critical reflection of each 
publication.  
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2. Empirical part 
2.1 Core publication I: Imagine all the forces 
 
Motivation 
The process of the Crimean annexation by Russia (March-August 2014) and the ongoing military 
conflict in the Donbass region of the Ukraine between pro-Russian and pro-Ukraine forces 
(March 2014-present) were the cause of a large international crisis between Western allies and 
Russia (Krotz & Maher, 2016). Since then a heavily waged dispute emerged about how to deal 
with Russia’s infringement of international law ranging from economical sanctions to military 
action. Although a majority of Germans blamed Russia for this crisis, only a minority favored to 
provide military aid in this conflict (Pew-Research-Center, 2015). The main motivation behind 
this article was to see whether threatening depictions between Russia and NATO allies―similar 
to those we have seen during the Cold War―can alter the willingness to military engage in this 
conflict.  
To keep the experimental design as realistic as possible and to increase ecological 
validity, we aimed to examine material that was already used in news coverage. The article 
“Nato-Alarm” (Amann, Blome, Gebauer, Neukirch, & Schult, 2014) published by the weekly 
German news magazine DER SPIEGEL fulfilled in large parts the necessary conditions we 
thought to be required to test our assumptions. First, the text as well as the visual depiction 
concentrated on the relationship between the opponents (NATO vs. Russia) and clearly 
distinguished both societies from each other. Second, most parts contained the description of 
military threats that originate from Russia in the present and possible future and how the NATO 
allies could react to it. Third, at least some parts allowed drawing parallels to the style of writing 
in the Cold War era. The news article “Bedingt abwehrbereit” (SPIEGEL, 1962), for example, 
described the insufficient defense capabilities of the Federal Republic of Germany in the case of a 
nuclear pre-emptive strike of the former USSR. Similar patterns could be seen in the article 
“Nato-Alarm”, although it rather concentrated on the defense capabilities of the eastern NATO 
allies like Latvia, Eastland and Lithuania (see for an exemplary depiction Figure 2). 
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Due to copyright issues Figure 2 had to be removed. 
 
 
 
 
Again, both news articles from DER SPIEGEL clearly differed in their content, but used, 
from a physical and psychological perspective, similar threat and defense mechanism to describe 
the situation. Furthermore, we only used the threatening parts of the article “Nato-Alarm” to test 
whether threatening descriptions of the resurrected East vs. West conflict can really alter the 
willingness to militarily participate in the conflict. By preparing a second, non-militant version of 
the article, we were able to test for the specific effects of military threats in this conflict. In the 
non-militant article potential military threats were mitigated and specific signs of military force 
levels removed from the accompanying illustration. Subtle reminders of former Cold War 
patterns (e.g., differentiation of NATO=blue and Russia=red), however, remained in the non-
militant article. To estimate the impact these news coverages have on the willingness to engage 
militarily, we additionally used explicit existential threats (mortality salience) as a comparative 
measure, thus linking the effect size provoked by the news article to typical findings from Terror 
Management Theory (Greenberg, Solomon, & Pyszczynski, 1997). Research about the awareness 
of existential threats has shown that it amplifies the efforts to defend one’s own culture, even by 
military means. To test our hypothesis in an experimental context, we used a 2×2 factorial design 
(N=112) with the factors article (original-bellicistic vs. neutral, non-militant depiction) and 
salience condition (mortality salience vs. control). The study was conducted from June-
September 2014, thus taking place in a precarious time frame of decision making about how to 
proceed with Russia. Results and further details will be explained in the publication attached 
below.  
  
Figure 2. Maps used in the news article “Bedingt abwehrbereit” (41/1962; left) and in the news article “Nato-Alarm” 
(14/2014;right) 
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Abstract 
A world divided into East vs. West: The so-called Ukraine Crisis has once more summoned 
outdated patterns of political thinking. Simultaneously, media discourses have flared up debating 
diplomatic and military solutions as possible policy responses. A majority of Germans, however, 
have remained hesitant to advocate any escalation of military conflict. We have been interested in 
how far reputable journalism concerning the Ukraine Crisis might activate a disposition towards 
military engagement. To evaluate the supposed impact of actual news coverage, we used explicit 
existential threats (mortality salience; MS) as a comparative measure. Typical effects of MS were 
derived from Terror Management Theory (TMT), which predicts that the awareness of existential 
threats amplifies the efforts to defend one’s own culture, even by military means. We used a 2×2 
factorial design (N=112) with the factors article (original-bellicistic vs. neutral, non-militant 
depiction) and salience condition (MS vs. control). Results revealed a strong impact of the 
original, bellicistic article, with increased willingness to deploy German forces at the Russian 
border, independently of the salience condition. Additional existential threats did not add further 
effects, as values for willingness were already very high. Classical effects regarding TMT were 
observed when people had read the non-militant article: here, the willingness to deploy forces 
only increased after a confrontation with existential threats. We conclude that threatening news 
coverage on the Ukraine Crisis has the ability to alter willingness for first-step military action at 
the Russian border by inducing effects that are―at least in their outcome―comparable to explicit 
existential threats.  
Keywords: Ukraine Crisis; medial depiction; threat; politics; mortality salience; terror 
management theory (TMT)   
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Introduction  
 
With the factual annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation in 2014, the conflict of East vs. 
West has once again become a political reality. Since then, a heavy dispute has been waged in the 
media, depicting a critical scenario in which one erroneous action by either NATO or Russia 
would lead to a massive escalation and, eventually, war. The depiction of such a scenario is likely 
to induce fear in people who might be involved in or affected by such a conflict, especially when 
attention is directed towards the build-up of mutual military threats (Buzan, 2008). At the same 
time, the latest national surveys revealed that only 19% of the German population advocate a 
German military involvement in the renewed East vs. West conflict; namely, the so-called 
Ukraine Crisis (Pew-Research-Center, 2015).   
In the present study we investigated the extent to which actual news coverage on the crisis 
is able to affect willingness to militarily engage in the conflict. We used parts of an article 
entitled “Nato-Alarm” (Amann, Blome, Gebauer, Neukirch, & Schult, 2014) published by the 
weekly German news magazine DER SPIEGEL. To estimate the impact this actual news 
coverage has on willingness to engage militarily, we used explicit existential threats (mortality 
salience) as a comparative measure, thus linking the effect size provoked by the news article to 
typical findings from Terror Management Theory (Greenberg, Solomon, & Pyszczynski, 1997). 
For an overview, we first outline recent findings concerning the effects of news coverage 
on personal and public beliefs. Then, we illustrate typical findings of existential threats derived 
from Terror Management Theory. Next, we explain how we derived our hypothetical 
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assumptions, and how these hypotheses are reflected by our study design. We then illustrate the 
procedure and results and discuss the consequences of our findings with regard to news coverage.  
 
The Effects of News Coverage   
 
Earlier research has acknowledged the significant impact of news coverage on people’s personal 
beliefs. It has been shown that media can affect people’s mindsets about political issues by 
selectively presenting information (Entman, 1989) and has therefore a dominating influence on 
public opinion (McCombs & Stroud, 2014). These effects even occur when people negate their 
impressionability to political advertising (Arendt, Marquart, & Matthes, 2015), or when the 
presentation of cues is very subtle (Schoormans, Carbon, & Gattol, 2011). Given the power 
media has in shaping public opinion, it has multifariously been emphasized that journalism bears 
the responsibility of critically reflecting upon backgrounds and consequences concerning 
precarious conflicts and crises (Arena, 1995). Journalism that fails to provide multi-dimensional 
coverage, thus setting a one-dimensional public agenda, could lately be observed during the 
financial crisis concerning Greece and the European Union. Bickes, Otten, and Weymann (2014) 
showed that the medial depiction in Germany about “corrupt and lazy Greeks”, in comparison to 
“hard-working Germans”, contributed substantially to anti-Greek sentiments among German 
citizens. Furthermore, the effects of non-counterbalanced journalism were observable―in an 
even more dramatic way―before the 2003 Iraq War. At that time, the absence of critical 
journalism was a supporting factor in the invasion of Iraq; the media missed the opportunity to 
weigh the claims of those arguing for and against military action (Hayes & Guardino, 2010). 
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Offering alternative viewpoints in the media seems to decrease support for additional military 
engagement in political crises, as ongoing political processes can be reflected on more critically 
(Balmas, Sheafer, & Wolfsfeld, 2015). On the other hand, journalism might become the 
transmission of threat which might provoke feelings of existential anxieties in its readers and 
therewith, as a consequence, might foster defensive reactions (Echebarria Echabe & Perez, 2015; 
Fischer, Greitemeyer, Kastenmüller, Frey, & Oßwald, 2007). Those defensive reactions induced 
by existential threats have broadly been studied in the context of TMT (Terror Management 
Theory) (Greenberg, et al., 1997).  
  
Terror Management Theory  
  
The psychological effects of existential threat depictions on the attitude and behavior of people 
have been extensively investigated in the course of Terror Management Theory (TMT) 
(Greenberg, et al., 1997). It has been demonstrated that people who have been existentially 
threatened hold up to their cultural worldviews and defend their own in-groups in various ways. 
By doing so, they buffer existential anxiety by experiencing themselves as a valuable contributor 
to a meaningful reality (Burke, Martens, & Faucher, 2010). For example, a series of experiments 
by Landau, Solomon, Greenberg, Cohen, and Pyszczynski (2004) revealed that people being 
confronted with existential threats showed an increased support for Bush and his counterterrorism 
policies; these policies were declared to be protecting the USA and upholding the associated 
cultural worldview after the 9/11 attacks. Regarding conflict situations, it has additionally been 
shown that existential threats lead to an increased support for military interventions (Motyl, Hart, 
& Pyszczynski, 2010), as well as to a stronger commitment to military violence (Hirschberger, 
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Pyszczynski, & Ein-Dor, 2009). In short: When people were confronted with existential threats, 
the probability of radicalization—in terms of hostility towards a perceived enemy—increased.  
Taken together, we were interested in how far reputable journalism focusing on military 
threat levels concerning the Ukraine Crisis would—despite only a minority of Germans 
supporting military engagements (Pew-Research-Center, 2015)—contribute to a higher 
willingness in terms of military action. To estimate the impact actual news coverage has on 
willingness to militarily engage in that conflict, we compared its effect to that from explicit 
existential threat. A confrontation with an existential threat is known to evoke high emotional and 
behavioral effects (Lambert, et al., 2014). Therefore, the hypotheses were established as follows:  
H1) That sections from the original, bellicistic article from DER SPIEGEL increase 
willingness to militarily engage in conflict.  
H2) Participants under explicit existential threat will show an increased willingness for 
military engagement in the Ukraine Crisis. 
   
To investigate the predicted interaction, we conducted a 2×2 factorial design. Participants were 
randomly assigned to the existential threat condition or the control condition before reading either 
parts of an original, bellicistic article or an altered, non-militant version of the same article.   
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Present Study  
 
To be able to appraise the effect size media depiction has on participant willingness to initiate 
first-step military action near the Russian border, we chose parts of an article titled “Nato-Alarm” 
(Amann, et al., 2014) published by the weekly German news magazine DER SPIEGEL. This 
original Threat of Forces article (ToF) included statements of politicians from NATO member 
states, among them German politicians, demanding to show military strength in the borderlands 
of Russia to dissuade potential invasions, e.g. in the Baltic. The text we used was comprised of 
440 words. The article was accompanied by the original illustration visualizing the current 
military force levels of Russia and the neighboring NATO members (Figure 1, right panel). The 
article was highly suitable for our investigations, as it addressed the threats of force by the two 
political powers both in a visual and in a written manner. We also favored using an article by the 
newsmagazine DER SPIEGEL, as it is one of Europe’s largest and most influential news 
magazines with a weekly circulation of about one million copies and a reach of over six million 
readers ("DER SPIEGEL performance data," 2015).  
In the neutral, Non-Militant version of the article, we had mitigated potential military 
threats and pointed out that there is a lively and controversial debate among politicians on 
sending NATO forces (including German forces) to the Russian border. The text comprised of 70 
words. Additionally, we had removed all specific signs of military force levels (i.e., icons 
depicting soldiers, artillery units, warplanes and battle tanks) from the accompanying illustration 
(Figure 1, left panel). The complete material used in the study can be obtained from the 
corresponding author.  
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With the mutual defense clause of NATO’s Article 5 in mind, and given the dichotomic, 
polarizing and confronting depiction in the diagram, we assume that all the NATO states will, in 
their entirety, be seen as a common cultural background that should be defended against 
aggressors. This assumption is supported by former research (e.g., Motyl, et al., 2010). We expect 
this to hold for the ToF as well as for the NM article, as the NATO-Russia-dichotomy was kept in 
the mitigated version.  
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Participants  
 
One hundred and twenty-four participants took part in this 2×2 factorial study design. Twelve 
participants had to be removed from further analysis due to premonition of taking part in a Terror 
Management Theory study, incomplete task fulfilment or interruption during the experimental 
procedure, yielding 112 participants who were included at the end. Fifty-four participants (30 
female; Mage = 25.2 years, SD = 6.7) completed the survey online and read the NM article after 
having been assigned to explicit existential threats or a control topic. 58 different participants (47 
female; Mage = 22.8 years, SD = 6.4) received the ToF article at the faculty of the University of 
Bamberg, again being assigned either to explicit existential threats or a control topic. All 
participants were German students who volunteered and received partial course credit. The 
number of participants was calculated before conducting the study assuming an effect size of d ≥ 
0.6 as predicted by earlier research on this topic (Burke, et al., 2010). The estimated number of 
participants was calculated by the G*Power software program (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 
2007) with the assumptions of two-tailed testing, α=.05, β=.80 and an allocation of N2/N1 of 1 
yielding an n per group of at least 25.  
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Procedure  
 
To conceal the main intent of the experiment, participants were invited to take part in a study 
about personality traits and their connection to attitudes towards international political issues. 
Therefore, participants first filled out the German short version of the Need for  
Cognitive Closure scale (NCC) (Schlink & Walther, 2007), the German adaptation of the 
Rosenberg Self Esteem Scale (SES) (Ferring & Filipp, 1996) and the State-Trait-Anxiety 
Depression-Inventory (STADI) (Laux, 2013)4. After that, participants were asked to answer two 
open-ended questions reflecting one of the two conditions:  
Mortality salience condition (MS). Existential threats were induced by the commonly used 
procedure in TMT research (Greenberg, et al., 1997) by asking: 
1) Please briefly describe the emotions that the thought of your own death arouses in 
you.  
2) Jot down, as specifically as you can, what you think will happen to you when you 
physically die.  
Dental pain condition (DP). The dental pain condition used the same format as the MS condition. 
Here, participants were asked to reflect about their feelings and thoughts when they have to visit 
a dentist due to dental pain. We chose this condition as the control topic, because the anticipation 
of dental pain induces non-existential threats and is suggested by existing and well established 
research (Burke, et al., 2010; Rosenblatt, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Lyon, 1989).  
                                                            
4 Since none of the ascertained scales had statistically significant correlations with participants’ decision making 
results, they were not regarded in further analyses.  
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As TMT research has shown that effects most likely appear when thoughts about death are 
removed from consciousness (e.g., Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & Solomon, 1999), we employed a 
delay task after the treatments in which participants were asked to complete a word search for 
five minutes. Subsequently, participants were given either the NM or the ToF article and were 
then asked: “How many soldiers / artillery units / warplanes / battle tanks should Germany send 
to countries like Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania to ensure sufficient protection from a possible 
Russian military intervention in Europe?” Finally all attendees were debriefed and thanked for 
their participation. The entire procedure lasted about 30 minutes and was approved by the ethics 
committee of the University of Bamberg.  
 
Results   
 
To measure the willingness to send German forces to the Russian border, we compiled a single 
indicator: If participants responded to all types of forces with 0, we coded willingness as 0 = no, 
not willing to send forces. If they responded to at least one type of force with >0, we coded 
willingness as 1 = yes, willing to send forces. The interrelatedness regarding the four single types 
of force was satisfactorily high with Cronbach’s α = .94 (M = 0.55, SD = 0.50), to justify this 
aggregation. The amount was registered for each force type, too, and compiled to the mean of a 
single indicator (internal consistency: Cronbach’s α = .84, M = 7,019.48, SD = 29,043.20).  
Regarding the willingness, we firstly calculated chi-square tests finding an overall effect 
for the 2×2 factorial design, χ2(3) = 11.23, p=.011, as well as for the main effect article, 
χ2(1)=5.03, p=.025. No significant effect could be observed for the main effect salience 
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condition, χ2(1)=1.50, p=.221, as the willingness after reading the ToF article was very high in 
both salience conditions. More recent papers as well as classic papers (e.g., Lunney, 1970) 
provide evidence that at least for sample sizes above 20 to 30, ANOVAs are an appropriate way 
to describe interactive effects. To analyze the impact of the specific article in combination with 
the salience condition, we conducted two univariate Analyses of Variance (ANOVA) for 
willingness and amount of forces, respectively, to be deployed at the Russian border. The two 
between-participants factors were article (NM vs. ToF) and salience condition (MS vs. DP). To 
test for simple main effects, we conducted further post-hoc tests via t-tests for independent 
samples.  
Willingness5. We found a main effect for the factor article F(1,108) = 4.40, p = .038, ηp2 = 
.039, with a higher willingness to send forces, when participants were exposed to the ToF article 
(M = 0.66, SD = 0.48) rather than to the NM article (M = 0.44, SD = 0.50), t(110) = 2.27, p = 
.025, d = .43. No main effect was observed for salience condition F(1,108) = 1.62, n.s., whereas 
an interaction effect for article by salience condition was obtained, F(1,108) = 5.26, p = .024, ηp2 
= .046. Testing the simple main effects of salience condition, we found that after having read the 
NM article participants showed a higher willingness in the MS (M = 0.63, SD = 0.49) compared 
to the DP condition (M = 0.30, SD = 0.46), t(52) = 2.48, p = .016, d = .70. No significant 
difference between the MS (M = 0.61, SD = 0.50) and the DP (M = 0.70, SD = 0.47) condition 
regarding the ToF article was observed, t(56) < 1—probably due to the reason that willingness to 
deploy forces was already considerably high for the ToF article, independent of having been 
                                                            
5 Since we conducted an ANOVA with dichotomous variables ranging from 0 to 1 the mean of the reported results 
can concordantly be interpreted as proportions. For example, participants’ willingness was M = 0.70, which means 
that on average 70% of the participants were willing to send forces.  
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exposed to MS or DP. Additionally comparing the DP conditions from the NM article and the 
ToF article, t-tests uncovered a large effect in terms of willingness: it rose from 0.30 (NM article) 
to 0.70 (ToF article), t(58) = 3.23, p = .002, d = .83 (Figure 2).  
 
 
Amount. We found a main effect regarding the factor article, F(1,108) = 4.94, p = .028, 
ηp2 = .044: participants wanted to deploy more forces after having read the ToF article (M = 
12,823.33, SD = 39,473.58) compared to the NM article (M = 785.71, SD = 3,791.33). Neither a 
main effect for salience condition F(1,108) < 1, n.s., nor an interaction effect between article and 
salience condition, F(1,108) < 1, n.s., could be observed (Figure 3). 
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Discussion  
 
We were interested in the extent to which threatening news coverage might affect willingness to 
militarily engage in the current Ukraine Crisis in comparison to explicit existential threats. 
Results revealed a strong impact of the original Threat of Forces (ToF) article in accordance with 
hypothesis 1. Existential threats did not add further effects here, as values for willingness were 
already high. Classical TMT effects could only be observed when people had read the Non-
Militant article: Willingness to deploy forces following an East vs. West thought pattern increased 
after a confrontation with existential threats as predicted by hypothesis 2. Explicit existential 
threats did affect willingness, but not the amount of forces that should be deployed. In contrast, 
the original ToF article led to overwhelming support for first-step military action towards the 
Russian border, regardless of the salience condition; and to a significantly higher amount of 
forces that was deemed appropriate.  
  
General Discussion and Conclusion  
 
“NATO and Russia do not consider each other as adversaries. They share the goal of overcoming 
the vestiges of earlier confrontation and competition and of strengthening mutual trust and 
cooperation.” (Founding Act NATO-Russia, 1997, p.1) This fundamental idea seems, as of 2015, 
to have been replaced by a political entrenchment on both sides.   
It is not our intention to discuss the political whys and wherefores of this crisis, and which 
political actions would be the wisest. Our focus is the impact reputable journalism has on the re-
establishment of threatening East vs. West schemata. By comparing media effects and the 
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outcomes of imagined existential threats in terms of greater enthusiasm for first-step military 
action, it seems that current respectable media coverage (such as in DER SPIEGEL) can attain 
effects that are―at least in their outcome―comparable to or even far beyond the effects of 
existential threats. We are aware that we only used parts of an example taken from a single news 
magazine and that we are a long way from judging the whole media landscape; yet results 
showed that threatening news coverage is able to strongly influence people’s military attitudes in 
this conflict. Additionally, we did not directly measure how participants were affected but only 
that they were affected. Future research has to investigate the cognitive affective process behind 
these effects.   
There is no simple solution or word of advice. The honest depiction of political crises, no 
matter how threatening, is one of the core duties of journalism. The news magazine DER 
SPIEGEL, in particular, has been a role model of critical journalism in post-war Germany; for 
example in the 1950s when the nuclear firepower of the USA and Russia had become more than 
sufficient to annihilate the whole of mankind.   
However, we were surprised by the magnitude of the effect evoked by the original article. 
The dichotomous viewpoint expressed in the text, as well as by the illustration, has activated a 
mindset with our participants that is, in its effect, comparable to an acute existential threat. When 
it comes to the intensity of the military actions in question (that is, the amount of forces to be 
deployed), the article showed a greater impact than confrontation with one’s own mortality did.   
Based on the fact that the media affects public opinion (Gunther, 1998), with specific 
influences on the progression of a crisis (Baum, 2002), we deem it crucial that reputable news 
coverage includes alternatives to military threat scenarios in their reporting in order to mitigate 
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the probability of further escalation. News coverage solely foreboding the terror of war, thus 
following the old-established East vs. West schema, might attenuate alternative voices in public 
debate. In the worst case, it might reduce the probability of peaceful and diplomatic solutions by 
increasing people’s inclination to support military engagement in the conflict.  
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Critical reflection 
The investigation presented in this publication supported the assumption that the combination of 
threats and even subtle reminders of former Cold War patterns can increase the likelihood of 
military thinking. As mentioned earlier, collective identity can be a strong predictor of social 
behavior in times of political crises and social changes (Polletta & Jasper, 2001). The provided 
information here was able to draw a line between us and them by creating two separated groups 
with seemingly different shared social identities. Furthermore, if participants felt that the action 
of the other society (in this case Russia) might have harmful consequences for them or the group 
they belong to, they seemingly perceived a state of threat and uncertainty. Thus, the perception of 
a society that has threatened the own society in the past with the possibility of doing it again, can 
create a collective emotional orientation (Bar-Tal, 2011) of fear that seems to (automatically) 
lead to defense mechanism in terms of military action. In other words, the stage is set for a 
reemerging intractable conflict. 
Although other studies have proven similar effects before, it seems remarkable to show 
these effects in the resurrection of a former conflict that was thought to be overcome with the 
Cold War era. In addition, these effects are even more strikingly in the light of having used a 
German sample keeping in mind that German people are usually cautious when it comes to the 
usage of military means since World Word II. Thus, results vividly illustrate the mechanism of 
social identity and threats in this conflict and, additionally, point to the crucial role of provided 
information when it comes to opinion formation in international conflicts.  
Besides that and in general, it has to be said that there are different views and needs 
among the NATO allies (e.g., Baltic States) about how to deal with this conflict in order to create 
a sense of security (Durkalec & Kroenig, 2016). Some are arguing that sates have to build peace-
through-strength while others say that precisely this military build-up will make a serious 
escalation more likely (for an overview about the arguments see Vasquez, 2009). I agree that 
there is possibly no easy answer about how to oppose Putin’s action, but I believe that we have to 
learn from the past and to pay attention that history does not repeat itself―a history that was 
fulfilled with political and military tensions that brought the world to the edge of the abyss. A 
one-dimensional and threatening depiction of this resurrected conflict―which I aspect to occur 
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on the Russian side as well―might be a first step to create immovable fronts between the 
societies again, with (to my opinion) an increased potential for an escalating spiral of conflicts. 
As mentioned in the discussion, this publication is far away of judging a single publisher 
or even the whole media landscape. Our society crucially benefits from diverse and free news 
coverage. Nevertheless, we have to keep in mind that especially during contentious and 
dangerous conflicts, people are in particular susceptible to information and the media has a 
responsibility to report in a multidimensional way. The presented findings underline the 
persuasiveness through provided information and although we only used parts of the news article, 
it is hardly possible to simply dismiss the fact that the material being used was rather part of real-
time news coverage than purely fictional.  
However, some critical notes about the procedure have to be made and further questions 
still remained open. From a methodological point of view, it can be seen critical that the texts in 
both articles (original-bellicistic vs. neutral, non-militant depiction) were not equal in their length. 
It remains the possibility that the deeper elaboration of the longer original-bellicistic article may 
have influenced participants’ choice of action. Furthermore, the survey period was relatively long 
and although statistical tests for time related influences on the presented results showed no effect, 
there might have been fluctuations concerning the development of the conflict itself. This, in turn, 
could have influenced participants’ perspective about this topic.  
A different point concerns the assumption of having used subtle Cold War reminders 
(NATO=blue; Russia=red) in the non-militant article, which―in combination with explicit 
existential threats―have led to similar results as the original-bellicistic article. In fact, results 
cannot definitely tell what kind influence these reminders might have had, because similar 
findings could have been made by simply inducing existential threats without these reminders. 
Therefore, the next publication tries to address these points and wants to shed light on the 
question whether subtle variations of visual depictions referring to the former conflict of East vs. 
West might affect people’s way of perceiving their relations nowadays.  
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2.2 Core publication II: How colors might shape the political perception of East 
versus West 
 
Motivation 
During the middle of the year 2015, Bar-Tal’s prognosis concerning the course of intractable 
conflicts (Bar-Tal, 2011) seemed to turn into reality again; tensions in resurrected East vs. West 
conflict got intensified. Driven by NATO’s fear of a possible Russian invasion of the Baltic and, 
vice versa, by Russia’s fear of a Western military dominance in the Baltic, both sights started to 
announce new plans of nuclear armament (Durkalec & Kroenig, 2016; Simpson, 2016). By that 
point it was no longer questioned whether armed forces should be deployed at all, but rather how 
many of them should be used as a deterrent. In other words, the vicious circle of intractable 
conflicts’ arm race was about to begin (again) including an increased threat of an escalation.  
Within this new dimension of debates between the two opponents, I was deeply interested 
whether subtle reminders of former Cold War patterns―what Bar-Tal defined as memory of the 
conflict (Bar-Tal, 2011)―could affect the way people perceive the relationship between the two 
political powers. Previous research has shown that colors depicted on a map can increase the 
perceived polarization between two parties (Rutchick, Smyth, & Konrath, 2009). Furthermore, 
prior held attitudes seem to influence people’s mental representation (e.g., cognitive maps) of 
political actors (Carbon & Hesslinger, 2013; Carbon & Leder, 2005b), which means that people 
rely on their worldview to adjust attitudes and process information (Kruglanski, 2004). Yet, it 
remained unclear whether these ideas could be applied to the resurrection of international 
conflicts. In other words: Can depictions referring to the past of a conflict that is seemingly more 
than 25 years ago really influence the way people perceive the resurrection of the conflict 
nowadays? 
Building on these thoughts, an experimental design was prepared that included a 
fabricated news article describing the new plans of Russia as well as of the NATO states 
regarding their nuclear armament. The only thing that was manipulated during the experiments 
was the way of depicting both political powers on a map, which was embedded in in the middle 
of the news article. Therefore, participants either received a (fabricated) news article in which 
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both world powers were depicted on a map as Russia=red and NATO=blue―referring to the Cold 
War’s demarcations (USSR=red; NATO=blue)―or vice versa; Russia=blue and NATO=red (see 
materials used in Study 1 in Figure 3 and Figure 4). In doing so, we could test whether colors 
affect people’s attitude per se or if they need to be in the right context of the conflict’s history. 
Testing a different sample in Study 2, color assignments were fully removed and replaced 
by hachured distinctions or no distinctions at all. Here, the idea was to check whether the 
reversed color depiction (Russia=blue; NATO=red) might have simply confused people’s 
perception and, therefore, affected their attitudes. Additionally, Study 2 gave the option to test for 
possible geographical segregation effects (hachured condition) instead of color induced 
stereotypes in Study 1. To test for these possible effects, participants were asked to make 
assessment about the relations of NATO allies and Russia after reading the news article. 
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Learning from the critical reflection of the publication “Imagine all the forces”, the 
methodological procedures were also improved. First, the written content remained the same 
style across all conditions in Study 1 as well as in Study 2. Second, the amount of words 
describing Russia’s and NATO’s mode of action were nearly balanced out for both sides. Third, a 
pretest (N=20; 14 female; Mage=28.2 years, SD=9.0) was conducted to examine possible 
differences between the level of induced threat regarding the written description of Russia 
(M=3.30, SD=1.56) and the NATO states (M=3.75, SD=1.55), showing no statistical difference 
F(1,19)=1.03, p=.324. Forth, to simulate the effects of information representation as realistic as 
possible and to increase ecological validity, the time frame of conducting the survey was 
considerably shortened. We started surveying at the 3rd of August 2015 and finished it at the 5th 
of August 2015, which corresponds to a time frame of 48 hours. In doing so, we were able to 
control for external influences and developments concerning the conflict itself by collecting data 
from 145 participants simultaneously for Study 1 and Study 2. Therefore, we created the 
possibility to simulate the effects of different information representation in a real-time related 
context of opinion formation. Results and further details will be explained in the publication 
attached below.  
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Critical reflection 
The results described in the publication revealed that even seemingly subtle reminders of the 
former conflict within information representations can affect people’s political perception. 
Although we visually separated NATO allies and Russia in three out of four conditions within the 
study designs, only the Russia=red and NATO=blue condition showed significant effects on 
participant’s political perception. The simple usage of colors referring to the old-established Cold 
War patterns led people―especially those blaming Russia for the crisis―to perceive an 
increased political distance between the two political powers.  
Again, Bar-Tal’s assumption about the socio-psychological infrastructure of intractable 
conflicts seemed to be confirmed focusing on the important factor of the memory of the conflict 
as an influential predictor of current opinion formation. This means that triggering the memory of 
the conflict which is more than 25 years ago can still reinforce people’s thinking to interpret the 
new conflict. Proving this effect is highly interesting, because it demonstrates how deeply the 
memory of the conflict can be rooted in people’s mindsets and simultaneously influence the way 
we perceive the resurrection of the conflict nowadays. Furthermore, results vividly illustrate the 
power of even subtle variation in news coverages, which can affect the way people process 
information and build up their attitudes. Since analyses didn’t reveal any simple main effects, 
these depictions might not affect people per se, but can confirm and reinforce prior held attitudes. 
From a practical perspective, these findings give hints about how media coverage can avoid 
biased attitude formation by using less historically charged depictions.  
On the other hand, one might argue that the color red induces negative attitudes per se. 
Since statistical analyses didn’t show any simple slope effects in the NATO=red and Russia=blue 
condition, we didn’t find any evidence that it really does. Furthermore, it was tested whether red 
might provoke any aggression related attribution to either the NATO allies or Russia by asking “I 
consider the act of NATO/Russia as aggressive”. Again, neither main, interaction nor simple 
slope effects showed any statistical significance indicating that the color red has had a specific 
political and to the former USSR related effect.  
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Nevertheless, and although it was also tested for possible aggression inducing effects of 
the color red—where no effects could be found in both studies—it cannot fully be decided within 
the scope of the current study whether the strong effect of the color red has a general and 
stereotypical red-Soviet-Union-association for Russia. Hence, it remains the possibility that these 
effects might occur for other former USSR states like Belarus, Kazakhstan or Kyrgyzstan.  
Further limitations of the studies were that we only used one scenario describing the 
possible armament of both political powers. Results may vary if the situation is depicted less 
threatening since people process information under threat differently (see theoretical part of this 
thesis). Additionally, results cannot tell whether every reminder of the former Cold War will per 
se affect people’s assessment of the new conflict. Further research has to investigate the specific 
content and the relational effects of visual and written forms of such typical reminders 
concerning the memory of the conflict. However, these findings are a first step toward a fairly 
undiscovered field of psychological research and are in accordance with former findings showing 
that prior attitudes can bias information processing (Kruglanski, 2004) and mental 
representations (Carbon & Leder, 2005b). 
Building on this insight, the next publication tries to deepen the understanding on the 
interaction of semantical cues and predispositions concerning opinion formation in the emergence 
of actual political state of affairs, namely: The perception of conspiracies between the US and 
Russia in a real-time context. 
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2.3 Core publication III: Conspiracy formation is in the detail 
 
Motivation  
On Thursday, 28th of May 2015 at 09:34 PM (Central European Time (CET)) the online platform 
of Fortune magazine was one of the first titling: “Putin thinks the FIFA scandal is all a US 
conspiracy” (Smith, 2015). What has been happening up to then? 
 On Wednesday, 27th seven top officials from the Fédération Internationale de Football 
Association (FIFA) were arrested due to suspicion of corruption. US federal prosecutors 
disclosed cases where they accused these FIFA officials to be involved in wire fraud, 
racketeering and money laundering, which were additionally associated with the allocation of the 
upcoming football World Cups in Russia (2018) and Qatar (2022). As a result, questions were 
raised in how far the allocations (including the World Cup in Russia) were based on legal 
grounds and possible reallocations of the World Cups were not ruled out. Vladimir Putin, 
however, saw these actions as an obvious campaign by the US against Russia to have the World 
Cup withdrawn. This reasoning led Putin to see ‘multiple actors working together with a clear 
goal in mind, often unlawfully and in secret’ (Swami & Furnham, 2014, p. 220)―a current 
approach to define the belief in a conspiracy. 
 At this very moment my colleagues and I saw the unique chance to test several 
hypotheses that haven’t been examined in the emergence of a political state of affair before: 
1) Is conspiratorial reasoning of conspiracy believers and sceptics in an ongoing event a 
priori determined? 
2) If not, what kind of information characteristics can be responsible for provoking a 
polarization? 
3) Would the USA and Russia work (again) as opponents on the global stage of 
conspiracies? 
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We grasped the opportunity presented by this highly relevant topic to experimentally test 
these research questions. To be sufficiently able to conduct the experiments under most realistic 
circumstances, we started surveying only 2 days after the US investigations had been revealed; 
that is, on Friday, 29 May 2015 at 10:00 AM (CET) and finished on the same day at 04:00 PM 
(CET). In a six hour time frame we collected data from more than 200 participants in two 
simultaneously conducted studies and asked them about their conspiratorial reasoning just in 
time, before the conspiracy theories flooding the newspaper message boards became common 
knowledge. Thus, the motivational orientation created by the experiment was rather driven by the 
informational uncertainty about the target issue than by uncertainty caused due threats as in the 
previous studies. From a practical view, using this uncertainty is highly important, because public 
events are almost always followed by discussions and debates, often in social media and message 
boards, about the event's ‘true nature’. Thus, results allow drawing ecologically valid conclusions 
about how provided information might affect people’s conspiratorial reasoning under real 
circumstances.  
Looking into the content, Study 1 investigated how depicted causation (direct vs. indirect) 
might invoke a bias in believers and sceptics regarding conspiratorial reasoning about an ongoing 
event, namely; whether US investigations against FIFA were more or less likely to be seen as a 
conspiracy against Russia to sabotage the football World Cup in 2018. Study 2 concentrated on 
the depicted intention (strong vs. weak purposeful) and its possible effects on people’s 
conspiratorial reasoning. 
As in the other publications described before, we used fabricated news article to be evaluated 
by participants. The text of every condition was unique in one to two sentences appended at the 
end of the main text. In these sentences, we implemented hints of direct and indirect causation 
(Study 1) as well as strongly purposeful (MiHoP) and weakly purposeful (LiHoP) intentions 
(Study 2) indicating that US investigations could be seen as an attempt to harm Russia. Results 
and further details will, again, be explained in the publication attached below. 
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Critical reflection  
Taking the opportunity to investigate conspiratorial reasoning under real-time circumstances in 
an ongoing political event gave profound insights about how opinion formation is, again, guided 
by the way of provided information. Results indicate that a polarization regarding a supposed 
conspiracy in an ongoing political event—for those with high versus those with low 
conspiratorial predispositions—is not permanently in effect. Instead, this could be interpreted as a 
bias becoming active only when a direct causation or strong purposeful intentions were depicted, 
but not for the depiction of indirect causation or weak purposeful intention. 
From a practical point of view, a polarized opinion about a possible conspiracy between 
Western allies and Russian is (again) possible to occur, but it has to be triggered by certain kind 
of information—like the headline “Putin thinks the FIFA scandal is all a US conspiracy”—
instead of coming ‘out of nowhere’. Although previous research already showed that conspiracy 
theorists do not necessarily see planned deception behind every event (Dieguez, Wagner-Egger, 
& Gauvrit, 2015), these findings fill the gap of evidence based insights in an applied socio-
political context. Thus, conspiracy ideation seems be driven by predisposition and provided 
information. 
Despite the fact that this first-time attempt to experimentally trace the formation of 
conspiratorial thinking revealed valuable insights, there are still some limitations regarding these 
findings. First, results do not tell that people with high conspiratorial predispositions get triggered 
by certain information in particular. Analyses do only show that the gap of interpreting the event 
as a conspiracy increases between those with high versus those with low conspiratorial 
predispositions, if certain semantical cues (here; direct causation and strong purposeful intention) 
were available. Furthermore, both studies only investigated a single event and the measurement 
of conspiratorial predispositions was aimed to account for political conspiracy beliefs and not all 
conspiracy beliefs per se (e.g., extraterrestrial cover-up; see also Brotherton, French, & Pickering, 
2013). There might be the chance that people with a broader spectrum of conspiracy beliefs do 
indeed see ad hoc deceptions behind many upcoming events. Further research has to test in how 
far the different dimensions of conspiratorial predispositions might interact with certainty content 
of information or specific content-related events. 
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In a similar vein, specific conspiracy ideas can be connected to a person's political 
orientation; liberals tend to believe in conspiracy theories about influential corporations of the 
rich, while conservatives tend to believe in conspiracy theories about governments (Uscinski & 
Parent, 2014). Conservatives, for example, show an increased skepticism over whether Barack 
Obama was really born in the United States, whereas liberals do not (Pasek, Stark, Krosnick, & 
Tompson, 2015). That means, asking someone about his or her attitudes towards a possible 
conspiracy might also highly depend on the content of the conspiracy as well as people’s general 
political attitudes.  
Additionally, the specific semantic differentiation of provided information in 
experimental designs is challenging. The distinction between causation and intention, for 
example, will necessarily provoke semantical overlapping. Even if the post-hoc manipulation 
check revealed that the conditions significantly differed from each other, it does not mean that 
they are absolutely distinct to each other (Alicke, 2000). Future research should try to avoid 
semantical overlapping to increase further informative values. 
Furthermore, we did not check for the credibility of the sources stating the decisive 
semantical cues. In Study 1 the sources were rather anonymous whereas in Study 2 one statement 
came from Vladimir Putin. Since source credibility seems to be a highly persuasive factor 
(Pornpitakpan, 2004), seemingly having impact on perceiving the Ukraine Crisis as well 
(Gebauer & Carbon, 2015), future research has to show in how far it might interact with 
conspiratorial predispositions.  
Taken together, this publication vividly underlines the interaction between information 
representation and conspiratorial predispositions. It shows that people heavily rely, but also 
differently interpret, the way information is presented in the course of new political state of 
affairs. Nevertheless, the critical reflection shows that there is still a long road to take until 
scientific insights will be able to explain whether, why and how people start to believe or reject a 
specific conspiracy. The contribution of the presented article is that predisposition and the 
content of provided information might play a decisive role. 
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2.4 International conflicts, provided information and opinion formation: A résumé 
 
Up until now, I have presented empirical evidence that people’s willingness to militarily engage 
in the resurrected East vs. West conflict can alter under threat and that these threatening 
depictions can be part of our everyday information-communication process, thus influencing 
people’s opinion formation (core publication I). Furthermore, it was shown that—especially 
under circumstances of possible further escalation—subtle reminders concerning the seemingly 
past of an intractable conflict can reinforce people’s stereotypical thinking by interpreting the 
new conflict through the prism of the past (core publication II). The recently presented 
publication described that the polarization of conspiratorial reasoning about an ongoing political 
event—namely, whether US investigations against FIFA in 2015 were more or less likely to be 
seen as a conspiracy against Russia to sabotage the football World Cup in 2018—is rather 
triggered by certain semantical cues than being preexistent a priori (core publication III).  
The reported publications do all share some common features: They describe how opinion 
formation can be influenced through provided information in the light of a (resurrected) 
international conflict. Due to the fact of conducting experiments in very short and sensitive time 
frames, results can be interpreted as a valid and reliable source about the susceptibility of opinion 
formation in international conflicts. On the other hand, one might say that people are per se 
susceptible to information when it comes to relatively new political issues. I will try to make the 
case that rethinking about ongoing political issues based on different contents of information but 
beyond current international conflicts is less suggestible. This hypothesis is derived from the fact 
that national debates do not necessarily include threatening or uncertain scenarios of two 
seemingly opposing societies—a situation under which people are especially suggestible to be 
affected by the content of information (for detailed description see paragraph 1.2-1.4 of this 
thesis).  
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 To illustrate this idea, I will shift the area of interest from international conflicts to a 
national political debate, namely: Can electromobility (e-mobility) become the transportation 
system of the future in Germany? This issue has been discussed controversially in Germany and 
public polls, additionally, revealed a large skepticism among Germans about the practicability of 
e-mobility (Schwedes, Kettner, & Tiedtke, 2013; Steinhilber, Wells, & Thankappan, 2013). 
Within this political debate, I was interested what kind of information or experiences needed to 
be met to affect potential users' attitudes towards e-mobility and their assessment on the prospect 
of electric vehicles. 
 Before I will lead over to the topic of e-mobility, I will introduce the Repeated Evaluation 
Technique (Carbon & Leder, 2005a) which was used to measure participant’s political rethinking 
in the area of e-mobility and is, therefore, a crucial part to understand the method being used in 
core publication IV.  
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2.5 Peripheral publication I: Simulating experiences: The Repeated Evaluation 
Technique (RET) 
 
Originally developed to capture the dynamic effects of innovativeness and attractiveness, the 
Repeated Evaluation Technique (RET) by Carbon and Leder (2005a) represents a methodological 
tool to measure attitude changes over time. The idea behind this concept is, that people’s liking of 
objects does not automatically increase by simply being exposed to them as proposed by the mere 
exposure theory (Zajonc, 1968). Instead, only innovative and really useful designs seem to gain 
acceptance in reality, which are, however, often unattractive at first sight (Leder & Carbon, 
2005). To be able to detect these dynamical effects, the authors propose a procedure where 
people’s attitudes are measured before (t1) and after (t2) having elaborated the presented objects 
or designs. In doing so, analyses can reveal whether the presented information were sufficiently 
able to change people’s attitude over time or not. This methodological approach has already been 
employed by a series of experimental (Faerber, Leder, Gerger, & Carbon, 2010) as well as 
psycho-physiological procedures (Carbon, Michael, & Leder, 2008). The attached publication 
below describes the detailed mechanism and methodological construction of the RET, which has 
also been applied to measure political rethinking about e-mobility based on different information 
representations (see core publication IV). 
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Zusammenfassung  
 
Dieser Beitrag liefert einen Methodenbeitrag zum Zusammenhang zwischen Nutzererleben und 
den ästhetischen Bewertungen eines Produktdesigns. Vor allem zwei Eigenheiten solcher 
Bewertungen sind dabei zu berücksichtigen: (1) Um differenzierte Ableitungen für den 
Produktgestaltungs- und Marketingbereich zu erhalten, benötigt man multidimensionale 
Erfassungsinstrumentarien; (2) Ästhetische Wertschätzung ist geprägt von starker Dynamik, die 
durch statische Abfragemethoden per se nicht adäquat erfasst werden kann. Um beiden 
Anforderungen gerecht zu werden, stellen wir sowohl ein implizites Maß zur Erfassung 
multidimensionaler impliziter Assoziationen (md-IAT) (Gattol, Sääksjärvi, & Carbon, 2011) als 
auch eine Methode zur Erfassung dynamischer Effekte ästhetischer  
Werturteile (Repeated Evaluation Technique, RET) (Carbon & Leder, 2005) vor. Im Sinne des 
ContinUE Modells (Pohlmeyer, Hecht, & Blessing, 2009) kann somit Nutzererleben unter 
Berücksichtigung von Erwartungen und fortlaufenden Neubewertungen („repetitive experience“) 
laborexperimentell simuliert werden.  
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Einführung  
 
Produktdesign ist ein wesentlicher Faktor für den Markterfolg auf stark von Wettbewerb 
geprägten Märkten für Produkte mit austauschbaren technischen Komponenten, wie z. B. HiFi-
Komponenten, Haushaltsgeräten, Mobiltelefonen etc. (Kreuzbauer & Malter, 2005). Erfolgreiche 
Produkte erfordern eine Passung zwischen Nutzerinteresse, -wünschen und Bedürfnissen und 
dem Design des Produkts. Für funktionale und technische Designaspekte existiert eine Fülle von 
Verfahren zur Testung der Usability (Jordan, 1998), human factors (Green & Jordan, 1998) und 
der Ergonomie (Salvendy, 2006). Diese Verfahren werden regelmäßig von Herstellern bei der 
Entwicklung von Konsumprodukten eingesetzt. Im Bereich der ästhetischen Beurteilung von 
Produkten existieren jedoch keine standardisierten Verfahren und können somit auch nicht 
systematisch in der Design-Evaluation eingesetzt werden (Hekkert, 2006; Jordan, 2000). Häufig 
werden ästhetische Dimensionen überhaupt gar nicht in der Produktevaluation berücksichtigt 
(Liu, 2003), obwohl ästhetische Dimensionen aus der Nutzerperspektive eine so bedeutende 
Rolle spielen, dass der Ergonomieexperte Patrick W. Jordan sogar von „new human factors“ 
spricht. Ein prominentes Beispiel für die Bedeutsamkeit ästhetischer Designaspekte ist ganz 
bestimmt der Apple iPod oder das jeweils neue iPhone. Solche Produkte sind bezüglich ihrer 
technischen Ausführung und Funktionalität relativ austauschbar mit Produkten anderer Firmen. 
Darüber hinaus sind Konkurrenzprodukte häufig sogar preisökonomischer. Dennoch schwang 
sich bspw. der iPod zum weltweit meistverkauften Mediaplayer auf. Diese Popularität verdankt 
der iPod seine hohen ästhetischen Werten, modischen Eigenschaften und seiner innovativen 
Philosophie. Der iPod wurde somit nicht nur zur ökonomischen Standsäule der Apple Inc., 
sondern auch zum Werbeträger für weitere Apple-Produkte.  
Eine steigende Zahl von Unternehmen richtet zunehmend die Aufmerksamkeit auf 
ästhetische Designaspekte, allerdings häufig ohne zu bedenken, wie ästhetische Qualität durch 
standardisierte Verfahren erfasst werden sollen. Bei der Produktentwicklung werden häufig recht 
aufwendige und kostspielige Tests mit typischen Nutzern in verschiedenen Settings eingesetzt. 
Darunter zählen Fragebögen, Fokusgruppendiskussionen, verbale Protokolle, aber auch car 
clinics im Falle des Automobilsektors (siehe, Jordan, 2000). Alle diese Methoden haben 
gemeinsam, dass Bewertungen durch Konsumenten nur zu einem einzigen Zeitpunkt erhoben 
werden. Darüber hinaus sind die Produkte für den Nutzer häufig recht unbekannt. Solche 
Evaluationsmethoden führen zu verzerrtem Antwortverhalten, welche nicht unbedingt die 
Bewertungen von Produktdesigns durch Nutzer im alltäglichen Leben widerspiegelt. 
Beispielsweise konnten Leder und Carbon (2005) anhand von Materialen mit unterschiedlichen 
Innovativitätsgraden zeigen, dass Nutzer ihnen bekannte Produkte mit recht konservativen 
Designs bevorzugen, während sie neue und hoch innovative Produkte ablehnten. Erfolgreiche 
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Produkte wie der Apple iPod zeigen jedoch, dass hoch innovative Designs im alltäglichen 
Nutzerverhalten durchaus stark präferiert werden.  
Simulation alltäglichen Erlebens: Die Repeated Evaluation Technique (RET)  
 
Wie können wir nun aber erklären, dass Nutzer recht konservative Produktdesigns in 
experimentellen Studien bevorzugen, jedoch häufig dazu neigen innovative Designs im 
alltäglichen Leben zu präferieren? Carbon und Leder (2005) argumentieren, dass die alltägliche 
Erfahrung mit einem Produktdesign vor der Messung von Präferenzen oder Gefallensurteilen in 
experimentellen Studien simuliert werden muss. Wenn die Erfahrung mit einem Design nicht 
berücksichtig wird, erhält man invalide und irreführende Vorhersagen für zukünftige ästhetische 
Urteile. Eine Folge davon ist, dass sich Produktenwicklungen an solchen limitierten 
Evaluationsmethoden ausrichten, die Nutzerurteile nur zu einem einzigen Zeitpunkt erfassen, 
ohne dass sich Nutzer mit dem Produkt vertraut machen können. Ohne die zeitlichen Dynamiken 
ästhetischer Urteile zu berücksichtigen, kann die Produktentwicklung in eine fatal falsche 
Richtung gesteuert werden. Neue Produktdesigns haben mit diesen limitierten 
Evaluationsmethoden eine höhere Wahrscheinlichkeit einer kurzen Marktdauer, ohne dass 
längerfristige Entwicklungen berücksichtig werden und können leicht ökonomisch scheitern.  
Die Repeated Evaluation Technique (RET, Carbon & Leder, 2005) bietet eine Antwort auf die 
oben skizzierten Probleme der a) fehlenden Vertrautheit mit neuen Designs und b) der 
Validitätsprobleme durch Messung zu nur einem Zeitpunkt, und integriert diese in eine 
zusammenhängende Prozedur. Die integrierte RET-Prozedur (siehe Abbildung 1) umfasst zwei 
identische Testphasen (t1 und t2) zu unterschiedlichen Zeitpunkten, bei denen zentrale 
ästhetische Variablen wie Gefallen, Innovativität, Valenz, etc. gemessen werden. Zwischen 
diesen zwei Messungen liegt eine Elaborationsphase (RET-Phase), in der das gesamte Material 
wiederholt von den Teilnehmern elaboriert wird. Typischerweise werden in der RET-Phase die 
Materialien anhand von Aspekten wie „angenehm“, „funktional“, „elegant“, etc. bewertet. Die 
Anzahl der Aspekte in der RET-Phase sollte mindestens 25 solcher Adjektive enthalten, um eine 
tiefe Elaboration zu gewährleisten. Die Auswahl der Adjektive hängt vom jeweiligen Produkt ab, 
dessen Design evaluiert wird.  
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Abbildung 1: Illustration des Verlaufs der RET‐Prozedur zur Evaluation von Produktdesigns.Quelle: Carbon & Leder (2007)  
 
Mit dem Einsatz der RET anhand von Autointeriors, die sich in Innovativität und Kurvigkeit 
unterschieden, konnte gezeigt werden, dass Nutzer nur anfänglich unbekannte und innovative 
Designs ablehnten und bekannte und konservative Designs bevorzugten (Carbon & Leder, 2005; 
Zajonc & Markus, 1982). Nachdem Nutzer das Material wiederholt bewertet und elaboriert 
haben, präferierten sie die innovativen Designs und wiesen das konservative Material zurück. 
Dieser Sachverhalt steht im Einklang mit der einflussreichen Theorie von D. E. Berlyne, die 
annimmt, dass Interesse, Neuartigkeit und Neugier Prädiktoren für exploratives Verhalten sind, 
welches wiederum direkt Präferenzen beeinflusst (Berlyne, 1970). Ebenso steht der Befund im 
Einklang mit Erkenntnissen aus der Marktforschung (Zandstra, Weegels, Van Spronsen, & 
Klerk, 2004). Abbildung 2 illustriert die Dynamik des Gefallens, die durch Elaboration bewirkt 
wird: Innovative Designs werden zu Beginn als relativ unattraktiv bewertet. Das entspricht den 
Standardmethoden mit nur einer Messung und führt zu irreführenden Schlussfolgerungen. 
Dagegen werden konservative Designs als eher attraktiv gewertet. Im Gegensatz dazu kann durch 
den Einsatz der RET zum zweiten Messzeitpunkt ein ganz anderes Antwortverhalten beobachtet 
werden: Nachdem die Materialen tief elaboriert und verstanden worden sind, vertauschen sich 
die Bewertungen von innovativen und konservativen geradezu in das Gegenteil. Hoch innovative 
Designs gefallen nun sehr viel mehr, während konservative Designs an Attraktivität verlieren. 
Die dritte Kurve in Abbildung 2 zeigt einen Verlauf während der Elaboration für „optimale“ 
Designs. Solche Designs sind gekennzeichnet durch eine optimale Kombination von sowohl 
Vertrautheit als auch Innovativität (entsprechend dem MAYA-Prinzip, Hekkert, Snelders, & van 
Wieringen, 2003). Sind Vertrautheit und Innovativität ausgewogen, dann werden Designs von 
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Beginn an als relativ positiv bewertet, gewinnen aber durch Elaboration mit der Zeit an 
Attraktivität. Ein zentrales Element der RET besteht demnach darin, eine Dynamik des Gefallens 
über die Zeit beschreiben und vorhersagen zu können.  
 
 
 
 
Abbildung 2: Idealisierte Verlaufsdynamik ästhetischer Qualitäten von Produktdesigns. Quelle: Carbon & Leder (2007) 
 
Mehrdimensionale ästhetische Wertschätzung  
 
Wie bereits durch die Beschreibung der RET angedeutet, ist die Beschränkung auf eine einzelne 
Variable bei der Erfassung ästhetischer Urteile nicht unbedingt zielführend. Häufig werden nur 
Gefallensurteile oder Präferenzurteile von Nutzern abverlangt. Zeitliche Dynamiken ästhetischer 
Urteile, wie sie mit der RET beobachtet werden können, zeigen bereits, dass solche Dynamiken 
nicht allein auf die Attraktivität wirken. Langeweile ist ein möglicher Faktor, der auf die 
Abwertung von Designs Einfluss nimmt. Ebenso kann plausibel angenommen werden, dass 
zuerst als innovativ beurteilte Designs im wiederholten Umgang mit diesen an 
(wahrgenommener) Innovativität verlieren. So lassen sich zyklische Dynamiken des Gefallens 
anhand von Automobildesigns beobachten (Carbon, 2010), was damit erklärt werden kann, dass 
sich Grundformen langsam ändern und alleine die Expositionshäufigkeit solcher Formen via 
höher-kognitiver Adaptationseffekte Gefallensbeurteilungen systematisch verändern (Carbon, 
2011; Carbon, 2012). Vormals innovative Designs entsprechen nicht mehr dem Zeitgeist und 
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werden ästhetisch abgewertet. Die gleichen Designmerkmale werden dann wiederum nach 
einiger Zeit wieder modern und attraktiv. Eine Analyse zentraler ästhetischer 
Bewertungskriterien (Faerber, Leder, Gerger, & Carbon, 2010) ergab, dass ästhetische 
Bewertungen mindestens an sechs wesentlichen Variablen valide erfassbar sind. Diese Variablen 
ergeben gemeinsam ein Konstrukt der ästhetischen Wertschätzung und bestehen aus: Gefallen, 
Innovativität, Interessantheit, Valenz, Langeweile, und Anregungsgehalt. Je nach Fragestellung 
können mehr oder weniger als diese sechs Variablen sinnvollerweise erfasst werden, ebenso auch 
weitere Variablen, die sich auf erwünschte oder auch unerwünschte Eigenschaften eines 
Produktes beziehen.  
Typischerweise werden direkte („explizite“) Maße für die Evaluation von Produktdesigns 
verwendet, wie z. B. verbale Protokolle oder Ratingskalen. Direkte Maße können aber prinzipiell 
von Nutzern kognitiv durchdrungen werden und somit zu verzerrten Antwortmustern führen. 
Ebenso können schwer verbalisierbare Eigenschaften nicht direkt gemessen werden. Einen 
Ausweg daraus bietet der multidimensionale Implizite Assoziationstest (md-IAT) (Gattol, 
Sääksjärvi, & Carbon, 2011). Der md-IAT ist eine Erweiterung des Impliziten Assoziationstests 
(IAT) (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). Der IAT misst indirekt Assoziationen von 
dichotom negativ und positiv ausgeprägten Attributen (z. B. „sicher“ vs. „unsicher“) mit 
visuellen oder semantischen Konzepten (z. B. „BMW“ vs. „Audi“) (Abbildung 3). Ein IAT 
besteht aus fünf aufeinanderfolgenden Phasen. Die Aufgabe ist, einen zentral prästentierten 
Stimulus so schnell wie möglich einer von zwei Kategorien per Tastendruck zu zuordnen. Die 
ersten zwei Phasen sind lediglich Übungsphasen, in denen Stimulus-Response-Assoziationen 
gelernt werden. Am Beispiel der Abbildung 3 wird in der ersten Phase, der target-concept 
discrimination task, die Assoziation des Konzepts „BMW“ mit dem linken Tastendruck gelernt, 
und die Assoziation des Konzepts „Audi“ mit dem rechten Tastendruck. Entsprechend werden in 
der zweiten Phase, der attribute discrimination task, linker und rechter Tastendruck mit den 
Attributen „sicher“ und „unsicher“ assoziiert. Danach folgt die erste Testphase (Phase 3: initial 
combined task), in denen beide Aufgaben aus den vorherigen Phasen kombiniert im Wechsel von 
einem Durchgang zum nächsten durchgeführt werden. Die vierte Phase ist die reversed target-
concept discrimination task. Sie ist erneut eine Übungsphase und der ersten Phase identisch, mit 
der Ausnahme, dass die räumlichen Zuordnungen der Konzepte zu den Tasten vertauscht werden. 
Die letzte Phase des IAT ist die zweite Testphase (Phase 5: reversed combined task), und ist 
identisch mit der ersten Testphase, mit der Ausnahme, dass die Vertauschung der Konzepte aus 
der vierten Phase beibehalten wird. Wenn nun in der mentalen Repräsentation „sicher“ und 
„BMW“ (Phase 3) stärker miteinander assoziiert sind als „sicher“ und „Audi“ (Phase 5), werden 
die Antworten in Phase 3 im Durchschnitt schneller sein, als in der Phase 5 (bzw. umgekehrt, 
wenn „sicher“ und „Audi“ stärker assoziiert sind als „sicher“ und „BMW“). Entsprechend 
besteht der IATö-Effekt aus den Differenzen der mittleren Reaktionszeiten der reversed 
combined task (Phase 5) und der der initial combined task (Phase 3).  
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Abbildung 3: Illustration eines einzelnen IAT. Der IAT misst Assoziationsstärken von Attributen („sicher“‐ 
„unsicher“) mit visuellen oder semantischen Konzepten („BMW“/“Audi“). Der multidimensionale Implizite Assoziationstest (md‐IAT) erweitert das 
Prinzip auf mehrere Attribute („sicher“‐„unsicher“,“umweltfreundlich“‐„nicht umweltfreundlich„aggressiv“‐„friedlich“, etc.)  
Durch Reihung einzelner IATs hinter einander, kann eine multidimensionale Beurteilung über 
verschiedene Attribute hinaus gewährleistet werden. Das Ergebnis ist ein Profil impliziter 
Einstellungen gegenüber einem Produktdesign. Gattol et al. (2011) illustrierten den mdIAT mit 
der Erstellung von impliziten Markenpersönlichkeiten zweier deutscher Automobilhersteller. Die 
Teilnehmer evaluierten die Marken mittels des md-IATs anhand von sechs für das Image von 
Automobilmarken relevanten Dimensionen: Sicherheit, Alter, Zuverlässigkeit, Aggressivität, 
Umweltfreundlichkeit und Innovativät. Das dadurch erhaltene implizite Einstellungsprofil gibt 
eine differenzierte Auskunft über die Nutzerwahrnehmung dieser Marken (Abbildung 4). 
   
Setting the tone for political views   PhD thesis Fabian Gebauer  
 
 
80 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Abbildung 4: Markenprofile zweier deutscher Automobilmarken. Die Darstellung zeigt ein implizites Einstellungsprofil, dass durch den md‐IAT 
erstellt wurde. Interpretiert werden kann das Profil folgendermaßen: Die Marke Audi wird als „sicher“, „jung“, „zuverlässig“, „friedlich“, 
„umweltfreundlich“ und „innovativ“ angesehen. Die Marke BMW hingegen als „unsicher“, „alt“, „unzuverlässig“, „aggressiv“, „nicht 
umweltfreundlich“ und „konventionell“. Quelle: Gattol, Sääksjärvi, & Carbon (2011).  
Ausblick  
Wesentliche Aspekte des Nutzererlebens und der ästhetischen Wertschätzung sind a) ihr 
multidimensionaler Charakter und b) ihre dynamische Veränderungen über die Zeit. Die hier 
vorgestellten Methoden adressieren beide Aspekte. Der md-IAT wurde konstruiert, um 
multidimensionale implizite Einstellungsprofile zu erstellen. Die RET erfasst dagegen 
Dynamiken des Gefallens und ästhetischer Wertschätzung über die Zeit. Beide Instrumente 
erfassen somit je einen der beiden zentralen Aspekte des Nutzererlebens. Zukünftige 
Weiterentwicklungen dieser Methoden werden auf einen integrativen Ansatz beider Aspekte 
abzielen: Die explizite und implizite Erfassung mehrdimensionaler ästhetischer Bewertungen 
über die Zeit.  
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2.6 Core publication IV: When information is not enough: Changing attitudes 
towards e-mobility 
 
Motivation 
Around the year 2009 a political sentence set new standards in Germany’s (ecological) 
transportation system: “It is our aim to have one million electric vehicles (EV) on German roads 
by 2020” said Chancellor Angela Merkel. Announcing an aim like this seems quite ambitious, 
especially, when following polls revealed that German people were still skeptical about using 
electric vehicles in their everyday life (Schwedes et al., 2013; Steinhilber et al., 2013). Most of 
the reservations about e-mobility were caused by the limited range of EVs (Franke, Neumann, 
Buhler, Cocron, & Krems, 2012), high costs and (infrastructural) charging complications 
(Bayram, Michailidis, & Devetsikiotis, 2013; Kampker, Burggraf, & Nee, 2012; Lin & Greene, 
2011). All these factors taken together bear the possibility of discouraging potential users from 
seeing EVs as a positive future prospect and ,thus, from interpreting EVs as a valuable alternative 
to conventional mobility concepts. What could be done to positively influence opinions about e-
mobility? 
The latest development in charging technology offered the possibility of charging EVs 
very quickly. This new fast-charging-technologies enable the charging of an EV with a nearly 
empty battery to a capacity of 80% in less than 30 minutes—much faster than conventional AC 
charging technology which needs several hours for the same gain of battery energy (Botsford & 
Szczepanek, 2009). It offers, therefore, an interesting opportunity to reply to typical concerns 
about the limited range and long-standing recharge cycles of EVs. However, several questions 
still remained open, namely: ‘Would these fast-charging-technologies really alter potential user’s 
attitudes towards e-mobility in a positive way? If yes, what would be a proper way of promoting 
e-mobility’s improvement?’  
One might argue that announcing this innovation in newspaper advertisements would help 
to convince people of seeing EVs becoming a major mobility concept in the future, while others 
say that people have to experience e-mobility to positively increase their attitudes towards it 
(Franke, Cocron, Bühler, Neumann, & Krems, 2012). Since the adoption of innovations directly 
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influences the productivity as well as the profit of countries and companies (Mairesse & Mohnen, 
2002), it seems important to be able to predict those progressions for the future of e-mobility.  
With the Repeated Evaluation Technique (RET)—introduced in paragraph 2.5—we are 
able to examine the dynamic effects fast-charging might have on the attitudes of potential users. 
The main research question was whether simple information representation or active hands-on 
experience would be most effective to affect people’s attitudes about e-mobility. Using the 
methodological background of the RET, we conducted two experiments in which participants 
either actively experienced the charging technologies or only passively received pure information 
about these technologies. In doing so, we were able to create insights about the impact of fast-
charging on potential users’ attitudes. Furthermore, it helps clarifying what kind of information 
representation might be most convincing; pure information or hands-on experience? Experiments 
were conducted between July and August 2013, which was a crucial period for e-mobility with a 
large market launch of EV serial models (i.e., BMW i3 in November 2013) being just around the 
corner. Thus, results might help to understand how attitudes towards e-mobility can be improved 
to face the challenges for an ecologically valid transportation system. Detailed descriptions, 
analyses of the results and further discussions are provided in the publication below.  
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Critical reflection 
Taking the opportunity to examine in how far the presentation of innovations concerning e-
mobility might affect people’s attitudes towards the concept of EVs produced valuable insights, 
in general for the field of e-mobility and, in particular, for this thesis.  
First, experiments demonstrated possible implications of how e-mobility could be brought 
closer to a wide range of people. Merely by letting people engage with the concept of e-mobility 
and giving them the chance to actively explore the facilities of EVs—especially the method of 
fast-charging—improved their attitudes towards EVs significantly. Thus, e-mobility may become 
more attractive when potential customers have the chance to actively take part in the way e-
mobility works, bearing in mind that fast-charging is capable of improving assessments of the 
future prospect of EVs—an important factor to achieve the political aims announced by 
Chancellor Angela Merkel.  
On the other hand, results do also demonstrate that purely providing information is not 
persuasive per se. Here, the written description of either fast or slow charging had no influence 
on participants’ attitudes towards e-mobility. Unlike the effects presented in the other core 
publications, people’s attitudes in national political debates seem less susceptible through 
provided information. I will get back to possible explanations and theoretical implications for this 
thesis in the discussion part of section 3.  
Nevertheless, some limitations of the presented findings have to be made. Taking into 
account that participants’ average age in both experiments slightly differed, the associated driving 
experience with conventional cars might be an influential factor. People with more experience (as 
in experiment 1) might be better in estimating their everyday usage and, therefore, realize that 
fast-charging might fit to their everyday driving behavior. Younger people, however, are rather 
unexperienced and might overestimate their imagined driving behavior, thus not being impressed 
by ‘still’ needing 30 minutes to recharge. Additionally, we cannot judge whether only interacting 
with the car instead of charging it would have greater or lesser effects on people's acceptance of 
e-mobility.  
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 The methodological approach being used in these experiments was different to those 
presented in the previous core publication in this thesis. Here, we calculated a measure of 
differences (before and after the presentation of information), whereas the other publications only 
measured attitudes after the presentation of information. This methodological difference does not 
make comparisons between these publications impossible, but the reader has to bear in mind that 
this publication rather depicts a (political) rethinking than simply querying attitudes after the 
presentation of information.  
These findings, however, are another important piece of the puzzle to reconstruct how and 
why different information representations affect people’s opinion formation in the field of 
political thinking. In the following sections I will discuss and outline possible explanation for the 
presented findings of this thesis and guide through practical implication these results might have.  
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3. General discussion 
 
„We have a state of affairs that may be called the essential dilemma of modern 
democracy. On the one hand, we, as a society, value persuasion; our government 
is based on the belief that free speech and discussion and exchange of ideas can 
lead to fairer and better decision making. On the other hand, as cognitive misers 
we often do not participate fully in the discussion, instead relying not on careful 
thought and scrutiny of a massage but on simplistic persuasion devices and 
limited reasoning.“ Pratkanis and Aronson (2001, p. 31) 
 
Pratkanis’ and Aronson’s description of the essential dilemma of modern democracy puts the 
general insight of this thesis into a nutshell: Providing information is crucial for an enlightened 
society, but neither are most information neutral nor is the human mind processing them in a 
neural way. In an age of communication where increasingly complex scenarios are aggregated 
into simplistic information depictions simultaneously flooding our cognitive processing system, 
people seem less likely to relay on careful thoughts than on rapid decision making. This is not an 
accusation levelled at any individuals, but rather an observation that the fast-moving nature of 
socio-political events does not often allow for a differentiated point of view. 
This conclusion seems especially to be true in times of international crises and conflicts, 
where thoughts were penetrated by threat and uncertainty about possible outcomes. Whenever we 
feel vulnerable or perceive threats, we have a desire for knowledge that is clear, stable and 
unambiguous (Thorisdottir & Jost, 2011) and favorably corresponding to our current worldview 
in order to avoid further uncertainty (Kruglanski, 2004). Thus, people do not only heavily rely on 
information by accident, but do also have psychological needs to find this information to form 
and confirm their opinions and attitudes.  
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Applying the experimental designs of this thesis to current international conflicts and 
political state of affairs and, additionally, conducting them within time frames where opinion 
formation was rather unsettled, made it possible to follow up characteristics that can shape the 
assessment of current political state of affairs.  
First, it has been shown that threats can play a decisive role. When people were threatened 
by either military means or implemented existential threats, their military thinking was altered. 
This effect even occurred in a sample where only a minority of the population favored to provide 
military aid in this conflict (Pew-Research-Center, 2015). Thus, if the collective emotional 
orientation is guided by predominant emotional responses of fear, people seem to be more likely 
to support future military usage as part of the ethos of the conflict (future orientation of the 
conflict) leading to a potential escalation of the conflict. Although previous research has also 
shown that political and existential threats can increase the likelihood of society’s extreme 
defense mechanism (e.g., Landau et al., 2004), it was new to show this effects in a European 
context concerning a conflict that seemed to be overcome more than 25 years ago. Since threats 
in international relations are part of everyday political life, one might argue that threats should 
foster conflict escalation whenever we perceive them. This is very unlikely, because we would 
then see military build-ups in every conflict around the world. Research has proven that the 
perception of threats does not inevitably lead to intergroup hostility. Perceiving the members of 
the opposing society as individuals with similar fears, providing information about peaceful 
solutions, or making common and shared identities salient are just a few options to reduce the 
likelihood of favoring military strategies (for an overview see Jonas & Fritsche, 2013). Thus, 
breaking through possible escalating characters of vicious circles in international conflicts is in 
the hand of those who spread information, but also relies on people who act upon this basis not 
critically reflecting about other solutions or gathering further information.  
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Second, we have seen that information containing reminders of the past of a former 
intractable conflict can reinforce the political perception of the current conflict. It seems 
remarkable that merely varying the colors on a map referring to the collective memory of the 
former conflict can still affect people’s way of political thinking. It confirms findings that 
representative images of the conflict’s past can affect peoples’ political thinking (Paez & Liu, 
2011), but it extends insights that these effects can still occur after more than 25 years of 
relatively peaceful relations. Furthermore, it might additionally show that people get triggered 
whenever references were made to former Cold War patterns reinforcing their previous held 
attitudes and I expect this effect to occur on both sides: NATO allies as well as Russia. From a 
practical point of view, medial broadcasting on both sides should be aware of the implications 
such comparisons bring along: A low probability of a non-biasing perception and assessment of 
the new conflict. 
Third, the way of promoting the ethos of the conflict by the involved protagonists might 
additionally lead to a polarized view of further implications of the current conflict. We have seen 
that the polarized reasoning about specific political conspiracies does not come out of nowhere 
(core publication III). Instead, people were triggered by small narrative variations including 
direct causation and purposeful intention. Since conspiracies have been common in the Cold War 
era (e.g., Whitfield, 1996) people can get biased by the content of information to apply the same 
principles to the current conflict. Furthermore, once people are biased about the occurrence of 
such political conspiracies, they might also be guided by this motivational reasoning to judge 
about similar situations in the future (Miller, Saunders, & Farhart, 2016), thus influencing current 
shared societal belief and future orientation of the conflict.  
We have seen that various threats, visual depictions and narratives within information 
representation can affect the way people perceive the relationship between seemingly opposing 
societies in times of ongoing international conflicts. Since some variations of presented 
information appeared to be quite subtle, the question remains whether there is any chance to 
resist against this kind of persuasion? The answer is yes—but only if you are willing to. 
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Pratkanis and Aronson (2001) present several strategies to counteract on rash decision 
making based on the available information. First, people have the tendency to think that (possible 
persuasive) messages have more impact on others than on themselves. But believing to be 
immune to persuasion does not mean that you really are immune. Research has shown that people 
who even negated to be affect by right-wing populism were influenced by their political 
advertising (Arendt et al., 2015). On the other hand, if people got warned of forthcoming 
persuasive messages and accepted possible factors influencing their attitudes, they were less 
suggestible (Freedman & Sears, 1965). Thus, the first step to open the door for counteracting rash 
and biased decision making is to admit to be impressionable by messages and the style of 
information representation. Based on this, there are several ways to examine whether and how 
one’s own attitudes may have been influenced. I will briefly outline the most relevant ones with 
respect to the content of this thesis (for a detailed description see Pratkanis & Aronson, 2001, pp. 
329-356): 
o Monitoring one’s own emotion. What kind of emotional responses does the 
content provoke in you? Are you happy or anxious? Do you perceive an increased 
thinking of us vs. them? Research has vividly proven the important role of 
emotions on decision making (Weber & Johnson, 2009)—and so did this thesis. If 
you feel strong emotional responses, the authors propose to step outside the 
situation and try to analyze what is going on. 
o Try to think rationally about the issues by asking thinks like: “What kinds of 
labels are used?” “What arguments are used to describe the advocate’s position as 
well as those from the opposing position?” Rationalizing the pros and cons of 
available information reduces stigmatizing, especially under threat (Jonas & 
Fritsche, 2013) 
o Try to understand the full range of options available before making decision by 
asking: “Are their other options available?” “What might happen if I chose other 
options than the first one that pops in my mind?” Conscious thoughts about 
competing options seems important to adjust overhasty behaviors (Baumeister, 
Masicampo, & Vohs, 2011) 
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Pratkanis and Aronson (2001) describe some useful tools that might pretend people from 
rash decision making in precarious situations. Nevertheless, they admit that we neither have the 
time nor the cognitive capacity to go through their presented checklist in our everyday decision 
making process. Furthermore, they explicitly emphasize that not every message or information 
has to be persuasive and that certain circumstance foster how and why people are affected by 
specific information. We have learned about several factors affecting people’s attitudes in the 
context of the resurrected East vs. West conflict within core publications I-III of this thesis (e.g. 
seemingly opposing societies, threats, uncertainty, visual reminder of the past of the conflict and 
semantical cues in narratives).  
On the other hand, core publication IV decisively illustrates that information is not 
persuasive per se. Although the presented studies were also conducted within sensitive time 
frames, purely presenting information did not alter people’s political view in the context of e-
mobility. This might have several reasons that possibly interacted with each other:  
1) Instead of an international conflict where the action of an opposing side could have had 
harmful consequences, the political debate about e-mobility was conducted on a national level, 
namely in Germany. Thus, participants were not driven by predominant emotional responses (i.e. 
fear) and less likely to be influenced.  
2) E-mobility had difficult times being promoted in in a positive way in 2013, with 
German people still being skeptical about using electric vehicles in their everyday life (Schwedes 
et al., 2013; Steinhilber et al., 2013).  
3) People seem generally less committed to change their everyday lifestyle (Ohm & 
Thompson, 2004) and, thus, positive innovations in the field of e-mobility might be less 
convincing, if they were only presented in written forms instead of experiencing them in real-life 
contexts.  
Taken together, the presented publications highlight the susceptibility of opinion 
formation in (re-)emerging political affairs under threat and uncertainty and its suggestibility 
through informational content. At the same time, we see the contextual limitation of 
persuasiveness in our everyday life and political rethinking. 
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4. Conclusion 
 
The findings reported within this thesis reveal the decisive role of provided information in the 
field of political thinking in a couple of different political arenas. It outlines the circumstances 
under which specific types of information can crucially affect people’s assessment of current 
political state of affairs. Conducting investigations under highly ecological valid settings also 
pave the way to a better understanding of opinion formation in ongoing political debates. Thus, 
results allow following up about how attitudes and interpretations concerning international 
conflicts and national debates can be construed und reinforced through provided information. On 
the other hand, it just wouldn't be right to tempt that people are only passive consumers and 
helpless victims of mass communication. Instead, this thesis also tries to emphasize conscious 
ways of decision making based upon information being presented to them. Nevertheless, it 
illustrates that politicians, authors, publishers and everyone else having public responsibility 
should carefully chose how to depict political conflicts in order to try avoiding biased perception 
among their audience.  
 Taken together, this thesis aims to contribute to a better understanding about how opinion 
formation in real world contexts might be construed. Furthermore, it underlines the importance of 
basic and applied research methods that comprehensibly outline psychological processes in 
current political state of affairs in order to increase the understanding of social process in the field 
of political thinking.  
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